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Abstract
We study a novel privacy concern, viz. peer disclosure of sensitive personal information in online
social communities. We model peer disclosure as imposing a negative externality on other people.
Our model encompasses the benets from posting information, positive externalities such as recog-
nition and entertainment benets due to others' sharing of information, and heterogeneous privacy
preferences. We nd that regulation of peer disclosure is necessary. We consider two candidate
regulations { nudging and quota. Nudging reduces user participation and privacy harm and some-
times improve social welfare. By contrast, imposing a quota often improves user participation,
privacy protection and social welfare. Adding a nudge on top of a quota does not bring additional
benets. We show that any regulation that uniformly controls the disclosure of sensitive and non-
sensitive information will not serve the triple objectives of reducing privacy harm, increasing social
welfare, and increasing information contribution. We derive a necessary condition for solutions
that can fulll these three objectives. We also compare the incentives of the platform owner and
social planner and draw related managerial and policy implications.
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I. Introduction
User-generated content is rife on social networking websites such as Facebook and Youtube. Such
content sometimes contains information (generally referring to any text, voice recording, image, and
video) about other people (\peers"), which can bring unintended fame or consequences. For example,
a high school teacher was sacked in 2013 after her student posted a picture of her providing alcohol
and condoms in a prom after-party on Instagram (New York Daily News 2013). A 15-year-old boy in
Quebec was abused after a video of him playing a character in Star War went viral on the Internet.
The boy made the video for a school project but the video was shared by his friends on the Internet
without his consent (New York Times 2003). Many children today are upset because their parents
share their personal pictures or videos online (New York Times 2016). Generally, a person may inict
privacy harm on other people by disclosing their personal information with the public (DiMicco and
Millen 2007; Tufekci 2008; Henne and Smith 2013; Choi et al. 2015).
From a social welfare point of view, the privacy harm from peer disclosure should be balanced
against the disclosure benets. People enjoy social interaction and sharing interesting moments with
friends. Friendly disclosure such as birthday greetings or achievement recognitions can bring joy to a
social community. Practically, it is dicult for a social community to avoid mentioning related people
in its conversations or exchanges. Hence, the pressing issue is to help users interact eectively without
excessively infringing other peoples' privacy in online social communities.
The current privacy practice in online social communities mainly targets users' voluntary dis-
closure of their own information. For instance, Facebook oers users an option to restrict access to
their information, including posts, proles, and photos by other users. Users can also select whose
information to view in their own timelines and remove tags about themselves from related posts and
photos.1 However, these controls do not address peer disclosure, where a user's privacy is infringed
because her friends post information about her without providing her with sucient controls over the
disclosed information. Therefore, we face a novel challenge: How does the privacy externality arising
from peer disclosure of personal information aect the development of online social communities?
Should we impose new policies to reduce the harm due to peer disclosure? If so, how should we design
1 For a comprehensive review of Facebook's privacy options, see https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242/
(accessed May 2017).
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the policies? Would community owners prefer such regulation?
To address these questions, we develop a stylized model that captures users' strategic decisions
when they share information in an online social community. In our model, a fraction of users always
participate in the community due to psychological commitment, membership, or other altruistic mo-
tivations (Hosanagar et al. 2010; Bateman et al. 2011). The other users are not committed and will
strategically decide whether to join the community, taking into account the expected benets from
posting information, positive externalities from viewing posts containing others' personal informa-
tion, and privacy harm resulting from the disclosure of their personal information by other people.
A non-committed user would join the community if and only if she receives a higher utility from
participation than staying out. The users dier in their sensitivity towards privacy.
With this model, we characterize the impacts of peer disclosure, viz. how it aects users' deci-
sions to join the community and post information about other people. In particular, we seek economic
policies that motivate users to internalize the privacy harm caused by their posts. Two broad solu-
tions prevail in the literature of negative externalities: Indirect control and direct control. Indirect
control, dating back to Pigou (1920), uses an appropriate pricing scheme that charges agents for the
externalities that they impose on others. Such externality pricing has been shown to be eective in
areas such as environmental protection and trac control (Cropper and Oates 1992). A common
implementation of externality pricing is to impose a tax, where the tax rate is set such that the agents
would choose the ecient levels of externalities (Vickrey 1963; Sandholm 2002, 2005). In the online
social community setting, we propose \nudging"as an alternative form of externality pricing. A nudge
is a soft paternalistic measure that operates as a cue to remind users of the potential privacy damage
that their posts could bring to others, or as an extra time delay in the form of a \cooling-o" period
for users to consider withdrawing their posts. The purpose is to \nudge"users to think carefully about
the privacy consequences of their posts (Acquisti 2009; Wang et al. 2013; Almuhimedi et al. 2015). A
nudge has essentially a similar eect as a Pigouvian tax, where the \tax" here is non-monetary but
exhibited in the form of additional time or eort in posting each piece of information.2
To directly control negative externalities, the classical approach is to use command-and-control
regulations that directly restrict the agents' actions (Fullerton and Metcalf 2001). A typical imple-
2 Unlike a monetary tax, the cost due to a non-monetary tax, such as a nudge, cannot be recovered and hence becomes
a deadweight loss to the society.
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mentation is to impose a quota or provide an allowance to each agent with the objective that the agent
will generate the ecient level of externalities (Copes 1986; Calthrop and Proost 1998). Imposing a
quota in online social communities is straightforward. We simply need to set a limit on the number
or length of posts allowed for each user within a given time period.
The nudging and quota policies, corresponding to externality pricing and command-and-control
regulation of negative externalities, are inline with the practices adopted in many industries, including
cigarette and alcohol taxes, pollution permit, and road space rationing. Besides externality pricing
and command-and-control regulation, the prior literature has advanced other solutions to address neg-
ative externalities, including subsidies for abatement, marketable permits, and deposit refund systems
(Stavins 2011). These solutions, however, may not be applicable in online social communities, which
mostly feature large numbers of users and hence the exchange of user permits is practically infeasible.
It is also dicult to provide subsidies or request for deposits as most online social communities do not
charge any fees to users. Another approach to address the peer disclosure externality is to deploy new
technologies. For instance, using text and image processing and advanced data analytics, online social
community owners may attempt to distinguish sensitive from non-sensitive personal information and
directly regulate a user's disclosure of sensitive information about other people. We analyze these
technical solutions in Section 4.1.
We nd several unique results on nudging and quota. A nudge decreases user participation and
contribution of information, but it also decreases the total privacy harm and sometimes increase social
welfare by driving some users out of the community. By contrast, a quota preserves users' incentive to
join the community and always increases social welfare, but it cannot encourage information contri-
bution either. These ndings exemplify the conicting goals of enhancing social welfare and privacy
protection vis-a-vis promoting community development in terms of increasing participation and in-
formation contribution. Our model provides a novel theoretical framework for analyzing the optimal
policy designs in regulating online information contribution and peer disclosure.
We also nd that quota dominates nudge in increasing user participation and social welfare.
Contrary to the prior literature which suggests that a composite measure is more eective in addressing
externalities (Roberts and Spence 1976; Christiansen and Smith 2012), we nd that nudging users
on top of a quota does not bring additional benets. Furthermore, although the social planner and
community owner may variously benet from imposing a quota, they mostly prefer dierent quotas
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because of misaligned objectives. They may prefer the same quota only when the community owner
wants to grow its community size in terms of user participation. If it wants to maximize information
contribution by participating users, then it will never prefer a nudge or quota. Based on this result,
we derive a general condition that is necessary for any economic policy to reduce privacy harm and
increase social welfare while increasing overall information contribution.
Our contributions are three-fold. First, we show that regulation is necessary when users can
freely post information about other people in an online social community. To our knowledge, this
is the rst analysis addressing the privacy harm caused by peer disclosure on the Internet. Second,
we illustrate the nuanced impacts of imposing a nudge and quota, particularly their implications
on user participation, which has not been formally analyzed in prior studies (Schulze and d' Arge
1974; Weitzman 1974; Collinge and Oates 1982). Third, we uncover a novel dilemma, viz. welfare
maximization and privacy protection are not aligned with community development. We provide some
suggestive directions to resolve this dilemma, such as tailoring the nudge and quota for privacy-
infringing posts or facilitating users to prune sensitive information related to them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 presents the model and analyzes the impacts of imposing a nudge and quota. Section 4 derives a
necessary condition for solutions that reduce privacy harm without sacricing information contribu-
tion. Section 5 illustrates the ideas in this paper using a numerical example. Section 6 analyzes three
extensions. Section 7 discusses the implications of this research and concludes the paper.
II. Related Literature
This study is closely related to the emerging stream of research that studies how peer disclosure aects
consumers and that suggests possible remedial actions. Choi et al. (2015) study how embarrassing
posts by friends in online social networks aect individuals' perceptions of social relationship and their
consequent behavioral responses. Several studies have proposed measures to help consumers remove
information shared by others without their consents (Besmer and Lipford 2010; Henne and Smith
2013). In general, the solutions involve identifying the shared information (e.g., by facial recognition
technologies) and helping aected users to negotiate with the parties posting the information (e.g., by
requesting for removal of infringing photos). Such solutions apply ex post, i.e., after the information has
already been posted. Hence, they are inadequate because the damage is inicted once the information
is available on a public domain. An ideal solution should apply ex ante, i.e., it should incentivize people
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not to haphazardly post information about others. This is the focus here.
A large body of research has studied voluntary disclosure of personal information (see, e.g., Gross
and Acquisti 2005; Dwyer et al. 2007; Acquisti and Gross 2009) and its regulation (Hermalin and Katz
2006; Hui and Png 2006). This literature has variously advocated the use of\privacy nudges"(Acquisti
2009; Wang et al. 2013; Almuhimedi et al. 2015), which can be visual cues about the potential audience
of a post, a time delay before the post is published, or a feedback on the potential sentiment and
sensitivity of the post. The essential idea is to nudge users so that they will think twice about the
privacy consequences of their posts. The focus of this literature lies in protecting consumer privacy
in an online environment and the economic eciency of information disclosure. It does not address
the externalities due to information disclosure.
Prior research on privacy externalities mostly focus on marketing activities (Anderson and de
Palma 2009; Anderson and Gans 2011; Johnson 2013). Seller marketing imposes a direct externality
on consumers by either congesting consumers' attention span to process marketing promotions or
increasing their costs to read or process the marketing. This literature has proposed solutions to help
consumers address the externality. For example, Van Zandt (2004) shows that increasing senders'
transmission costs using tax or other technical measures can help increase the welfare of receivers
(consumers) and benet all senders. By considering consumers' privacy harm due to seller solicitations,
Hann et al. (2008) nd that it is optimal to impose a charge on seller solicitations. Motivated by these
suggestions, we analyze nudging as one candidate economic policy to regulate third-party externalities
from peer disclosure (cf. second-party externalities from sellers).
More broadly, the economics literature has extensively analyzed the impacts of imposing a Pigou-
vian tax and a limit on the externality-generating activities in various contexts featuring production or
consumption externalities, such as air and water pollution, smoking, and alcohol consumption (Weitz-
man 1974; Baumol and Oates 1988; Cropper and Oates 1992; Pizer 2002). An important consideration
in this literature is entry and exit. A tax penalizes a rm and hence may force the rm to leave the
industry in the long run, which can contract the industry and dampen social welfare (Schulze and
d' Arge 1974; Collinge and Oates 1982; Cropper and Oates 1992). In our setting, the privacy nudge
resembles a Pigouvian tax. Hence, it is important that we endogenize users' participation decisions
in studying the regulation of peer disclosure in online social communities.
By contrast, limiting the externality-generating activities may have a smaller impact on participa-
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tion. We consider the use of a quota as an alternative economic policy to cap or limit the externalities
due to peer disclosure. Prior research has also shown that one single policy, such as imposing a tax
alone, may not dierentiate activities that generate dierent degrees of externalities. Hence, adding
a direct control of the externality-generating activities may further enhance social welfare (Roberts
and Spence 1976; Bennear and Stavins 2007; Christiansen and Smith 2012). For example, to address
the externality due to smoking, we can apply a cigarette tax and concurrently restrict the number of
outlets or limit the opening hours of outlets that sell cigarettes. We adopt a similar idea and analyze
the merit of combining a nudge and a quota in this paper.
Finally, our work is related to studies of negative network externalities (Liebowitz and Margolis
1994), such as the congestion externality due to free-riding in peer-to-peer le-sharing networks (As-
vanund et al. 2004). The peer disclosure externality diers from congestion externalities in that it is
directly imposed at the individual user level instead of the community level. Hence, we must account
for the size of user community in analyzing its impact and regulation.
III. The Model
Consider a unit mass of users who can participate and post information in an online social community.
1 , 0 <  < 1, of these users are \committed" and always participate in the community. The other
 users are \non-committed" and will participate if and only if they receive a higher utility from
participation than staying out.3 Among all committed and non-committed users, , 0 <  < 1, have
high privacy sensitivity (\high types") and 1   have low privacy sensitivity (\low types").
Each user is connected to some \peers" in the social community. A connection can be interpreted
as a friendship link. We refer to a user's connected peers as \friends" and unconnected peers as
\non-friends". As is the case with popular social networking websites such as Facebook or LinkedIn,
the connections are undirected, i.e., two users accept each other as a friend once a connection is
established. Each user i has a probability of ni 2 [0; 1] to establish a connection with any other user.
Note that ni can also be interpreted as the number of friends of user i because we normalize the
total mass of users to be 1. We use Ni to denote the set of user i's friends and N i as the set of user
3 Individuals may participate in online social communities because of undisclosed self-interests, psychological commit-
ments, or other altruistic motivations (Bateman et al. 2011). The way we model heterogeneity in user participation
resembles the distinction between \altruistic" and \strategic" nodes in peer-to-peer (P2P) media distribution networks
in Hosanagar et al. (2010).
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i's non-friends. For a large population of users, ni is very small. This is consistent with the case of
Facebook, which has more than 700 million users but more than 95% of them have fewer than 1,000
friends (Backstrom 2011). We start with a simple setup where every user has the same number of
friends, i.e., ni = n for all i. We relax this assumption in one extension later.
We assume the users' types are evenly distributed in each user's friends and non-friends networks.
Hence, for any user i, both Ni and N i contain a proportion  of non-committed users and a proportion
 of high type users. Figure 1 depicts the composition of the population and the connection of user i
in a network with 18 users, where  = 1=2,  = 1=3, and ni = 1=3.
Figure 1: An example of user population and connection: total population = 18,  = 1=2,  = 1=3,
and ni = 1=3.
Each participating user can post sensitive and non-sensitive information about other people. Let
xit and yit be the amount of non-sensitive and sensitive information that user i posts about user t,
i 6= t. The posting of sensitive information imposes a negative externality (\privacy harm") on user
t. Evidently, each piece of sensitive information could cause dierent degrees of privacy harm, which
will likely follow some statistical distribution. Without loss of generality, We use H (L) to denote
the expected privacy harm that a high (low) type user suers from each piece of sensitive information
about her. We assume a participating user can post information about any other users, including
non-friends and non-participating users. In practice, Facebook users can share posts or photos about
anyone, including celebrities who do not have a Facebook account.
A user receives a unit benet, v, from posting each piece of information about other people. The
benet can come from the gratication of being perceived as knowledgeable, or tangible gains from
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advertising if the information attracts high viewership (e.g., garnering a large number of \likes" on
Facebook). The cost for posting a piece of information, including the time and eort to acquire, edit,
and upload it, varies according to the types of information and connection. We use Cx(xij) =
1
2cxx
2
ij ,
Cy(yij) =
1
2cyy
2
ij ,
1
Cx(xik), and
1
Cy(yik) to denote the cost functions for posting non-sensitive and
sensitive information about friends, i.e., j 2 Ni, and non-friends, i.e., k 2 N i.4 We use j to index
friends and k to index non-friends. The convex cost functions capture the increasing diculty to
collect and post information as the posting volume increases.
We assume it is more costly to post sensitive information than non-sensitive information, i.e.,
cx = c and cy =
c
 , c > 0 and 0 <  < 1. Intuitively, people guard their sensitive information such
as medical history or salary more carefully. People may also feel more uncomfortable in divulging
embarrassing posts about others when their own identities are observable in the community. We
assume that it is more dicult to post information about non-friends than friends, i.e., 0 <   1,
because of increased social distance and decreased level of trust towards non-friends. Realistically,
people post more about their online friends who are likely to be their friends, relatives, classmates,
or colleagues in their oine social circles (DiMicco and Millen 2007).
Besides the direct benet from posting, a participating user also benets from information posted
by others. We use e to denote the entertainment benet that a user enjoys from reading a piece of
information unrelated to her posted by others (e.g., many people enjoy gossips about celebrities shared
by others on Facebook). Similarly, we use w to denote the recognition benet that a user enjoys when
a piece of her non-sensitive information is posted by others (e.g., a person may enjoy pride when other
people share the news that he/she has won an award).
Let s be the set of participating users. User i's expected utility from participation,
uinijs =
Z
j2Ni
[v(xij + yij)  Cx(xij)  Cy(yij)]dj +
Z
k2N i

v(xik + yik)  1

Cx(xik)  1

Cy(yik)

dk + e
Z
m2s;m 6=i
Z
t 6=i
(xmt + ymt)dt

dm+ w
Z
m2s;m 6=i
xmidm  i
Z
m2s;m 6=i
ymidm:
(1)
The rst two integrals are user i's expected benets from posting about her friends and non-
4 The linear benet and quadratic cost functions give rise to diminishing marginal utility, which is a common feature
in the literature because it is mathematically tractable and often guarantees an interior solution. It also ts real online
social networks well. For example, no Facebook user would post all information about every other user, perhaps because
doing so is prohibitively costly.
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friends. The remaining three terms capture the externalities inicted by other users. Specically, the
third term is the entertainment benet, the fourth term is the recognition benet, and the last term
is the privacy harm.
Let Xi 
R
m2s;m6=i xmidm be the total quantity of non-sensitive information related to user i,
Yi 
R
m2s;m6=i ymidm be the total quantity of sensitive information related to user i, and Q i R
m2s;m 6=i
R
t (xmt + ymt)dt

dm be the total quantity of information posted by all participating users
except user i.5 With these notations,
R
m2s;m 6=i
hR
t 6=i (xmt + ymt)dt
i
dm  Q i  Xi   Yi. Equation
(1) can be rearranged as
uinijs =ni
"
vxij  
cx2ij
2
+ vyij  
cy2ij
2 
#
+ (1  ni)

vxik   cx
2
ik
2
+ vyik   cy
2
ik
2 

+ eQ i + !Xi   iYi;
(2)
where ! = w   e and i = i + e represent the recognition benet and privacy harm net of the
entertainment value for each piece of information. Without loss of generality, we assume ! > 0,
H = 1, and 0 < L < 1. We refer to eQ i + !Xi as the \positive externalities" that user i receives
from all information posted by other users, and iYi as the privacy harm that user i suers from
information posted about her by other users.
Note that participating users can post information about non-participating users. We assume
that a non-participating user is aected by the externalities caused by the information shared in the
community. Realistically, people may get exposed to information that goes viral in other media, and
celebrities can be defamed by information posted in an online community even if they are not its
members. In our model, conditional on s, user i's utility from staying out,
uoutijs =  (eQ i + !Xi   iYi) ; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) captures how easy it is for an outsider to get exposed to (or become aware of)
information posted within the community. The larger  is, the easier the information posted in
5 Because the size of user population is a continuous measure, including user i's contribution (which is just a point in
the integral) does not aect the aggregate sum, Q i. Continuous measures of user population is quite common in the
literature (see, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum 2010; Conitzer et al. 2012). It reects the realistic assumption where one
single agent's decision will not aect the collective outcome of the population.
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Table 1: Notations
: The fraction of non-committed users
: The fraction of users with high privacy sensitivity
ni: The fraction of population connected with user i, and ni = n in the main model
v: Benet from posting each unit of information
c: Cost coecient of posting non-sensitive information
 : Cost ratio between posting sensitive and non-sensitive information
: Cost ratio between posting information about friends and non-friends
: Weighted cost ratio between posting about friends and non-friends,  = n+ (1  n)
e: Entertainment benet from each unit of information posted by others
w Recognition benet from each unit of non-sensitive information posted by others
!: Net recognition benet from each unit of non-sensitive information posted by others, ! = w   e
i : User i's privacy harm from each unit of sensitive information posted by others, i 2 fL;Hg
i : User i's net privacy harm from each unit of sensitive information posted by others, i 2 fL;Hg, i = i + e
: The degree of information posted within community being exposed to outsiders
i: User i's average net privacy harm from each unit of information posted in the community, i 2 fL;Hg
 : Unit cost due to nudging
: Posting limit or quota
the community spreads outside the community. We can interpret 1    as the dierence between
the objective and subjective (perceived) information externalities, including privacy harm, faced by
a non-participating user i due to the information posted in the community. Hereafter, we refer to
measures scaled by  as \perceived"measures and unscaled ones as \objective"measures. For example,
iYi is objective privacy harm whereas iYi is perceived privacy harm. Table 1 summarizes the key
notations.
We study a three-stage game as shown in Figure 2. Stage 1 denes the environment, particularly
whether the posting of information is regulated. In Stage 2, non-committed users decide whether to
join the community. In Stage 3, participating users decide how much information to post.
Policy Instrument Participating Decisions Posting Decisions
Stage 2Stage 1 Stage 3
Figure 2: Timing of the Model
A. The Status Quo
We rst consider a baseline setting where users can freely make participation and posting decisions
without accounting for the privacy harm they inict on others. We use backward induction to derive
10
the subgame perfect equilibrium. Conditional on joining the community, user i's posting decisions,
xij , xik, yij and yik can be obtained from the rst-order conditions of equation (2):
xsqij =
v
c
; ysqij =
 v
c
; xsqik =
v
c
; ysqik =
 v
c
: (4)
The user would simply post information based on the ratios of posting benets over posting costs
when she omits the privacy harm caused by her. Her own privacy sensitivity will not aect her posting
decisions.
However, user i's participation decision depends not only on her own posting, but also on the
quantity of information others post about her. We consider a rational expectations equilibrium in
which users can anticipate other users' posting decisions. Substituting (4) into (2), user i's conditional
utility from participation,
usq;inijs =
(1 +  )v2
2c
  (1 +  )vsi
c
; i 2 fL;Hg; (5)
where s 2 [1   ; 1] because committed users always participate in the community. To simplify the
exposition, we let   n+ (1  n) (the weighted cost ratio of posting information about friends and
non-friends) and i   i e(1+ ) !1+ ; i 2 fL;Hg.
The rst term in (5), (1+ )v
2
2c , is user i's total benet from posting. The second term,
(1+ )vsi
c ,
is the net privacy harm (i.e., privacy harm net of entertainment and recognition benets) that user
i suers from participating in the community. In the second term, (1+ )vc = n(x
sq
ij + y
sq
ij ) + (1  
n)(xsqik + y
sq
ik ) is the amount of information posted by each participating user, and so
(1+ )vs
c is the
total quantity of information posted by the entire community. Therefore, we can interpret i as user
i's average net privacy harm caused by each piece of information posted in the community.6
User i's utility from staying out of the community follows equation (3), i.e.,
usq;outijs =   
(1 +  )vsi
c
; i 2 fL;Hg: (6)
6 A random piece of information may or may not be privacy-infringing to user i. i is the expected privacy harm if a
random piece of information is sensitive and related to user i minus the expected entertainment and recognition benets
otherwise.
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We impose the following regularity assumption.
Assumption 1 L > e(1 +
1
 ) +
!
 :
L  e(1 + 1 ) + ! is equivalent to L  0, which means that all low type users will participate in
the status quo because their net privacy harm is negative (meaning they benet from other peoples'
posting). Assumption 1 enables us to focus on a more realistic scenario where the privacy concern is
suciently salient to hinder some users from participating in the community.
Given s, user i will participate if and only if usq;inijs  usq;outijs . Let sL (sH) be the participation
rate for non-committed low (high) type users. The following results characterize users' equilibrium
participation as the posting benet, v, varies.
Lemma 1 In the status quo equilibrium, non-committed users will participate according to the fol-
lowing schedule.
v ssqL s
sq
H s
sq
(0; 2(1  )(1  )L) 0 0 1  
[2(1  )(1  )L; 2(1  )(1  )L] v=(2(1 )L) (1 )(1 ) 0 v2(1 )L
(2(1  )(1  )L; 2(1  )(1  )H) 1 0 1  
[2(1  )(1  )H ; 2(1  )H ] 1 v=(2(1 )H) (1 ) v2(1 )H
(2(1  )H ;+1) 1 1 1
Notes. ssq = (1  ) + (1  )ssqL + ssqH , i.e., the sum of all committed and non-committed low and high type users.
In the status quo, participating users ignore the privacy harm inicted on others. When the
posting benet, v < 2(1   )(1   )L, both low and high type non-committed users prefer to stay
out because the privacy harm outweighs the benet from posting information. As v increases, the
users will gradually participate by order of privacy sensitivity, and the participate rate increases with
v. When v is suciently large, all users participate in the community.
Let  be the social welfare, dened as the aggregate surplus of all users including the perceived
privacy harm suered by all non-participating users, Q be the total quantity of information posted
in the community, and  be the total objective privacy harm including the harms inicted on non-
participating users.7 The next lemma characterizes the outcomes in the status quo. Figure 3 illustrates
how the outcomes in Lemmas 1 and 2 vary with v.
7 We present the total perceived privacy harm in the Online Supplement. The analysis of objective and perceived
privacy harms give similar qualitative insights.
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Lemma 2 In the status quo, the total quantity of information posted, Q, and total privacy harm,
, increase with v. Social welfare is negative if and only if (i) 0 < v < 2[   (1   )H ], or (ii)
2[  (1  )H ] < v < 2 and  > (1 )H LH L .
Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes in the status quo.
Social welfare can be negative due to two reasons. Non-participating users carry negative utility
since they are also (partially) aected by the privacy harm generated in the community. When the
proportion of non-participating users increases as the posting benet v decreases, the overall negative
utility outweighs the positive utility from some of the participating users, therefore leading to negative
social welfare. As posting benet v increases, high type users could still have large negative utility
even after they participate, which is because the positive utility from posting is lower than the privacy
harm imposed on them. This could also lead to negative social welfare when there are many such
highly privacy sensitive users, i.e.,  is high enough.
Referring to Figure 3, one interesting observation in the status quo is that, when the social welfare
is negative, a slight increase in v may further decrease social welfare. An increase in posting benet v
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induces users to post more information and more non-committed users to join the community and post
information. Such additional information brings negative marginal benet due to its privacy harm.
The implication is that in some online social communities, having more users or encouraging users to
post more information involving peers can be bad. Indeed, many people post unveried gossips on
the Internet. Recent research has shown that online social communities or, more broadly, the Internet
can help propagate wicked materials to support racial hatred, political aming, or cyber-bully (see,
e.g., Davis 1999; Keith and Martin 2005; Kowalski and Limber 2007; Bhuller et al. 2013; Chan et al.
2016).
As a benchmark, we next calculate the rst-best posting decisions, in which we assume the users
take into account of the externalities from their posting behavior. Without loss of generality, we let
 = 1 and derive the rst-best posting strategies as:
xfbij =
v + e+ !
c
; yfbij = max

0;
 (v   j)
c

; xfbik =
(v + e+ !)
c
; yfbik = max

0;
 (v   k)
c

: (7)
A simple comparison of the above posting amount with those in the status quo, as shown in
equations (4) shows that users in the rst best case post more non-sensitive information and less
sensitive information than in the status quo, and the amount of sensitive information is contingent
on the privacy sensitivity of the posted subjects.
In the following sections, we analyze a few policies and compare their impacts on users' decisions.
We focus on two policies, nudge and quota, that are highly feasible to implement because these
policies uniformly apply to both sensitive and non-sensitive information. We then extend the analysis
to other policies, including targeted nudge, targeted quota, and information pruning, that dierentiate
between the two types of information, and these policies may become feasible with future advancement
in technology (such as machine learning and articial intelligence). We also provide implications for
each policy from the perspectives of the social planner and the community owner.
B. Nudge
We rst study the use of a privacy \nudge" as a regulation policy (Acquisti 2009; Wang et al. 2013;
Almuhimedi et al. 2015). The online social community can remind users of the potential privacy
infringements that their posts may cause on other people through, e.g., visual cues or warning mes-
sages. The community can also introduce an extra time delay before a post is really publicized to
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allow users a \cooling-o" period during which they can always revoke the post. Such privacy nudges
increase users mental eorts needed to post information and oer a chance for them to reconsider
their decisions. We model the privacy nudge as imposing an additional linear posting cost on users,
 2 [0; v].8 Intuitively, if the nudge exceeds users' posting benet, v, then users would obtain negative
benet from posting and hence no user would post any information.
Evidently, because the nudge applies to all users and information, it increases the overall cost of
posting information in the online social community. Highly drastic as it seems, mechanisms similar to
a non-discriminatory nudge are commonly observed in practice. For example, one renowned solution
to combat music or movie piracy is to impose a tax on all blank storage media such as CD or DVD
even though they are often used for legitimate purposes such as data storage. Bill Gates has famously
suggested an email tax to curb spam, which inevitably aects all legitimate uses of email. We add
the superscript n to all variables in the setting with a nudging policy.
With nudging, user i's utility from participation becomes:
un;inijs =ni
"
vxij  
cx2ij
2
+ vyij  
cy2ij
2 
  (xij + yij)
#
+ (1  ni)

vxik   cx
2
ik
2
+ vyik   cy
2
ik
2 
 (xik + yik)] + eQ i + !Xi   iYi;
(8)
The rst-order conditions of (8) give the following posting decisions:
xnij =
v   
c
; ynij =
 (v   )
c
; xnik =
(v   )
c
; ynik =
 (v   )
c
: (9)
Obviously, the nudge decreases the amount of information posted by participating users. However,
it does not aect non-participating users. Hence, user i's utility from staying out, un;outijs , has the same
form as equation (3). Her participating decision then depends on the comparison between un;inijs and
un;outijs . The following lemma summarizes the equilibrium participation rates.
Lemma 3 When a nudge,  2 (0; v], is imposed, non-committed users will participate according to
the following schedule.
By comparing Lemma 3 with Lemma 1, with nudging, a higher v is needed to encourage both
8 The ndings are qualitatively similar if we use a quadratic nudging cost.
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v snL s
n
H s
n
(0; 2(1  )(1  )L + ) 0 0 1  
[2(1  )(1  )L + ; 2(1  )(1  )L +  ]
v 
2(1 )L (1 )
(1 ) 0
v 
2(1 )L
(2(1  )(1  )L + ; 2(1  )(1  )H + ) 1 0 1  
[2(1  )(1  )H + ; 2(1  )H +  ] 1
v 
2(1 )H  (1 )

v 
2(1 )H
(2(1  )H + ;+1) 1 1 1
Notes. sn = (1  ) + (1  )snL + snH .
types of users to participate and post information. Not surprisingly, the nudge also leads to less
information posted and hence eectively reduces the total privacy harm created by the community.
The following proposition states these results formally.
Proposition 1 Comparing with the status quo, a nudge reduces user participation, total quantity
of information posted, and total privacy harm. Further, the participation rates, total quantity of
information posted, and total privacy harm decrease in the level of nudge,  .
Intuitively, users may be annoyed by the privacy nudge (e.g., warning messages, time delay) and
hence may post less information or even drop out from the community. Our result is consistent with
previous research showing that many consumers are impatient and may drop out of online communities
due to inconvenience (Galletta et al. 2006; Rajamma et al. 2009; Ding et al. 2015). It is worth noting
that, although a nudge can eectively reduce the total privacy harm as it discourages peer disclosure,
it also leads to less activity in the community and lower posting, entertainment, and recognition
benets. Its overall impact on the community is determined by the tradeos between these benets
and costs. The following result characterizes when a nudge is socially preferred.
Proposition 2 (i) A nudge can improve social welfare when social welfare is negative in the status
quo. The socially optimal nudge is  = v, which gives social welfare of 0.
(ii) A nudge always decreases social welfare when social welfare is positive in the status quo. The
socially optimal nudge is  = 0.
As discussed in Lemma 2, allowing users to post information is socially undesirable when the
social welfare is negative. Imposing a nudge can dissuade people from posting and hence improve
social welfare. The optimal outcome is to nudge all users extensively so that they do not post any
information. Social welfare will then increase from being negative to 0. A harsher nudge could
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be viewed as a less user-friendly interface. The results here show that when privacy externalities
predominate, an easier-to-use interface may actually hurt social welfare. By contrast, when social
welfare is positive, allowing users to post information brings more benets than harm. Imposing a
nudge will only increase the cost to the community. Hence, the optimal nudge is  = 0.
The implication of the nudging analysis is that, if a person is concerned about privacy, perhaps
she should simply not join the community. Incidentally, this implication is consistent with the Chicago
School's view of how privacy should be treated, although here the privacy harm arising from peer
disclosure is a form of negative externality that calls for regulation (Posner 1978, 1979, 1981; Stigler
1980).
Since a nudge always decreases user participation and posting of information, it obviously is not
in the interest of the community owner to impose a nudge. However, a social planner such as the
government cares more about social welfare and privacy. So, the social planner prefers nudging for all
v specied in Condition (i) of Proposition 2 because it helps achieve higher social welfare and lower
total privacy harm. Such discrepancy in objectives helps explain why most online social communities
today do not alert users about the potential adverse consequences of peer disclosure.
C. Quota
We next consider the merit of having a quota, , which is a limit on the total quantity of information
that a user can post in the community. We assume  2 (0; (1+ )vc ]. Recall from equation (4) that a
user would post (1+ )vc units of information in the status quo. Hence, when  >
(1+ )v
c , the quota
is not binding. We refer to any  2 (0; (1+ )vc ] as an \eective quota" as it will aect the user's
equilibrium behavior. We say that the quota is \ineective" otherwise.
We add the superscript q to all variables in the setting with a quota. Conditional on participation,
the user's posting decisions are now subject to an additional constraint
n(xqij + y
q
ij) + (1  n)(xqik + yqik)  : (10)
We compute xqij , y
q
ij , x
q
ik and y
q
ik by solving equation (2) with constraint (10). Because the
utility function in (2) is concave and  can not be greater than its unique interior solution, (1+ )vc , a
participating user will always use up the quota, meaning constraint (10) is binding, or n(xqij + y
q
ij) +
(1  n)(xqik + yqik) = . Similar to the status quo, with an eective quota, the equilibrium quantities
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of information are determined by the corresponding posting costs:
xqij =

(1 +  )
; yqij =
 
(1 +  )
; xqik =

(1 +  )
; yqik =
 
(1 +  )
: (11)
In sharp contrast to nudging which aects the community development in obvious ways (refer
to Proposition 2, the platform owner prefers not to nudge any participating users), a quota does not
impose any additional cost on users. Hence, it is not obvious whether the community owner's and
social planner's interests are aligned. In the following analysis, we examine the optimal quota in terms
of user participation, total quantity of information posted, and social welfare.
C.1. Participation-Maximizing Quota
We rst consider user participation. For online communities, particularly those at an early stage of
development, having a large user base is critical to triggering network eects among users and seeking
nancial support from venture capitals. We use the superscript ? to denote the optimal outcomes
when the objective is to maximize the number of participating users. Let  be an innitesimally small
positive number. The following proposition characterizes the optimal quota.
Proposition 3 Imposing a quota to the status quo will weakly increase the number of participating
users. The participation-optimal schedule of quota is:
(i) When (1   )(1   )L < v  (1   )(1   )L, the optimal quota is ? = , which gives
participation rates s?L =
(v )=((1 )L) (1 )
(1 ) , s
?
H = 0, and s
? = v (1 )L .
(ii) When (1   )(1   )L < v  minf(1   )(1   )H ; 2(1   )(1   )Lg, the optimal
quota is ? 2

0; 2(1+ )[v (1 )(1 )L]c

, which gives participation rates s?L = 1, s
?
H = 0, and
s? = 1  .
(iii) When (1  )(1 )H < v  (1  )H , the optimal quota is ? = , which gives participation
rates s?L = 1, s
?
H =
(v )=((1 )H) (1 )
 , and s
? = v (1 )H .
(iv) When (1 )H < v < 2(1 )H , the optimal quota is ? 2

0; 2(1+ )[v (1 )H ]c

, which gives
participation rates s?L = 1, and s
?
H = 1, s
? = 1.
(v) For all other v, imposing a quota will not improve the participation rate relative to the status
quo.
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We illustrate Proposition 3 in Panel (A) of Figure 4. Non-committed users will participate
only when they obtain higher utility from participation than staying out, which requires the positive
posting benets and externalities to outweigh the (objective) privacy harm. An eective quota limits
the amount of information that each user can post. This decrease in information causes the privacy
harm to decrease faster than the positive benets, which tends to encourage users to participate in
the community. As shown in Panel (A) of Figure 4, both types of users are now willing to participate
with a lower posting benet, v, when compared with the status quo.
Figure 4: Participation and welfare comparison.
C.2. Information-Maximizing Quota
We next consider the total quantity of information. Some online communities rely on user activities
to generate revenues. For example, Facebook places contextual advertisements related to user feeds.
Some specialized communities such as cyber-lockers obtain advertising revenues by capitalizing on
users' sharing of digital materials of broad interests. The following proposition characterizes the
impact of the quota when the objective is to maximize total information contribution.
Proposition 4 Imposing any eective quota,  < (1+ )vc , will decrease the total quantity of infor-
mation posted in the community.
A quota does not increase information contribution because it limits the amount of information
that a participating user can post. Although it helps attract more users to participate, the incremental
gain in information due to these marginal users does not outweigh the loss due to the reduction of
contribution from every user. Overall, Proposition 4 suggests that imposing a quota will not help an
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online social community in terms of increasing information contribution.
C.3. Welfare-Maximizing Quota
We now consider social welfare. For ease of exposition, we present the optimal quota in Appendix A.
The following proposition summarizes its impact.
Proposition 5 Imposing a quota to the status quo will increase social welfare. The socially-optimal
quota presented in Appendix A weakly reduces the aggregate privacy harm and increases the number
of participating users.
Recall from Proposition 2 that a nudge can improve social welfare only by nudging users out of
the community. Here, a quota encourages user participation but reduces the quantity of information
posted by each user. More users will join the community and contribute information but, by Propo-
sition 4, the total quantity of information will always decrease. This implies that both the net benet
from posting information and privacy harm will decrease for each user. Nevertheless, by the utility
specication in (2), the net benet of positing information will decrease at a slower rate than the
privacy harm, leading to an overall improvement in social welfare.9
Furthermore, Lemma 2 shows that social welfare is negative when the posting benet, v, is not
high enough because of excessive posting from all participating users. Imposing a quota will also help
because, by choosing a suciently small quota, the social planner can eectively contain the privacy
harm generated. As shown in Panel (B) of Figure 4, the social planner can always achieve a positive
social welfare by choosing an appropriate quota.
C.4. Quota vs. Nudge
By the above analysis, it is straightforward to see that the quota is better than the nudge in terms of
enhancing social welfare.
Proposition 6 The socially optimal quota weakly dominates the socially optimal nudge in improving
user participation and social welfare.
By Propositions 1 and 3, a quota increases user participation, but a nudge decreases user par-
ticipation. More importantly, the quota preserves users' incentives to post information. Panel (B) of
9 Proposition 5 also holds if the net benet from posting information increases linearly but the privacy harm increases
exponentially with the amount of information posted by each user on another user. Realistically, the marginal privacy
harm may increase when a user post more information about her friends { e.g., the accumulated information may allow
others to track a person with a higher precision which poses a bigger privacy threat.
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Figure 4 shows that the socially-optimal quota achieves higher social welfare than the socially-optimal
nudge when v is suciently high. When v is small, allowing users to post information is not socially
benecial. Hence, both the quota and nudge apply restrictively to discourage user posting. It is worth
noting that, as shown in Propositions 1 and 4, neither a nudge nor a quota can increase the total
quantity of information posted in the community.
C.5. Quota Choice between the Community Owner and Social Planner
Interestingly, Propositions 3, 4 and 5 suggest that the community owner will never prefer a quota
when it wants to maximize information contribution, but it may prefer a quota when it wants to grow
the number of participating users. Will the community owner and social planner ever prefer the same
quota? The answer is yes; a community owner who wants to maximize user participation may prefer
the socially optimal quota. Figure 5 plots the optimal quotas that maximize the participation rate
and social welfare. The optimal quotas overlap in some ranges of v, meaning they can serve both
purposes. We present the formal conditions where both the community owner and social planner
prefer the same quota in the Online Supplement.
Figure 5: Participation optimal vs. welfare optimal quota.
D. Combining Nudge and Quota
We next examine if combining a nudge and a quota gives any complementary benet. Obviously,
by Proposition 2, the optimal nudge can improve social welfare only by incentivizing all users not to
post any information. Adding a quota is not meaningful and will not make any dierence in such a
scenario. Therefore, we only consider the eect of adding a nudge on top of a quota.
Let ~ 2 (0; (1+ )vc ] be the free quota given to each user, beyond which a nudge ~ > 0 will be
21
applied to each additional piece of information posted by the user. Although the option of posting
beyond the quota gives users more exibility in posting information, the following results show that
it does not bring any benet to the community.
Proposition 7 The optimal quota weakly dominates the composite policy of adding a nudge to the
quota in terms of increasing user participation and social welfare.
With an appropriate composite policy, i.e., ~ < (1+ )(v ~)c , the users can post beyond the quota
if they are willing to be nudged. Such marginal posts generate more privacy harm on other people,
which dissuades the sensitive users from joining the community. With fewer participating users, the
community as a whole would generate less information. Hence, social welfare will decrease because
of both lower user participation and less surplus received by each participating user. Intuitively, the
composite policy neutralizes the benet of the quota. The purpose of having a quota is to reduce
privacy harm so that the privacy-sensitive users will nd joining the community attractive. Allowing
users to post beyond the quota, however, induces more privacy harm. This tends to drive the sensitive
users out and hence counteracts the quota.
Note that such composite policy will not increase the total quantity of information posted in the
community when compared with the status quo. This is because, by Propositions 1 and 4, both quota
and nudge always decrease information contribution. Hence, any combination of them will lead to
further reduction of information. Together with Proposition 7, we conclude that a composite policy
cannot serve the interests of either the social planner or community owner.
IV. Solving Discord between Community Owner and Social Planner
Many online social communities generate revenues by \dollarizing" their user bases. A common busi-
ness model is to serve context-based advertisements. For example, Facebook feeds advertisements to
users based on their activities such as \likes", shares, and comments. The success of such context-
based advertising depends greatly on whether the users are active, meaning the community owner
may prefer to maximize information contribution by its users. However, our results so far show that
a nudge or a quota, or their combinations, will never serve this preference of the community owner
despite the fact that the social planner may prefer a nudge or quota.
In general, consider the user's utility from joining vis-a-vis staying out of the community. Sub-
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tracting equation (6) from (5),
usq;in outijs =
(1 +  )v2
2c
  (1  )(1 +  )vsi
c
=
(1 +  )v2
2c
  (1  )  i Qsq(s); i 2 fL;Hg; (12)
where Qsq(s) is the total quantity of information posted in the community given size of participation,
s. User i will join the community if and only if uin outijs is non-negative. To address the privacy harm
due to peer disclosure, we have to curb user posting of information about other people. This reduces
the rst term in equation (12). Because each user would post less now, to serve the community
owner's interest in increasing the total quantity of information, we must increase the number of users
participating in the community. However, given xed (1  )i, such a requirement necessarily causes
Qsq(s) in the second term of equation (12) to increase. Hence, taken together, usq;in outijs will decrease,
meaning fewer users will want to participate in the community. This contradicts the requirement of
increasing user participation.
Accordingly, any feasible welfare-maximizing solutions that also serve the community owner's
interest in increasing the total quantity of information must decrease (1  )i in the second term of
equation (12). The next result formalize the necessary conditions for such solutions.
Proposition 8 To reduce the privacy harm due to peer disclosure without decreasing the total quantity
of information posted in the community, we must either reduce the average net privacy harm from
posting each piece of information, L or H , or increase the ease for outsiders to get exposed to the
information posted within the community, .
Equation (12) and Proposition 8 are important because they highlight the intricate dilemma
in the peer disclosure problem, viz. the contradictory objectives of decreasing privacy harm and
maintaining information contribution. They crystallize the necessary characteristics of solutions that
can address the peer disclosure problem. How can a community owner simultaneously curb peer
disclosure, increase total posts, and improve social welfare? Increasing the community's visibility, ,
so that non-participating users are more aware of the information posted in the community is one way
to entice users to join the community. However, increasing  means that all non-participating users
would suer more (perceived) privacy harm, which is not desirable to the social planner. Arguably,
making more non-participating people suer is not a good way to boost participation and information
contribution. Therefore, in the following discussion, we focus on policies that decrease the average
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net privacy harm from each piece of information, L and H .
The nudge and quota analyzed in Sections B and C do not change i because they penalize sensi-
tive and non-sensitive information uniformly, causing them to decrease by the same proportion. The
community owner may be able to improve the distinction of sensitive from non-sensitive information
with, for example, latest photo recognition technologies or text mining and natural language process-
ing techniques. Taking this possibility as given (i.e., we do not consider the community owner's cost
of investing in technologies to detect sensitive information), we discuss some suggestive solutions to
address the dilemma highlighted in Proposition 8.
A. Targeted Nudge and Quota
If distinction of sensitive from non-sensitive information is possible, then the community owner can
impose a nudge or quota to target sensitive information. As a result, participating users will reduce
the extent of posting sensitive information relative to non-sensitive information, reducing the overall
privacy harm generated from the community. Formally, we add the superscripts \tn" and \tq" to all
variables when a targeted nudge and a targeted quota are used. When sensitive information can be
perfectly separated from non-sensitive information, equation (12) becomes
utn;in outijs =
v2
2c
+
 (v   )2
2c| {z }

  (1  ) Qtn(s)  (i   tn)| {z }

; i 2 fL;Hg;
where tn =
 (i + !)
(1 +  )[v +  (v   )] ;
(13)
and
utq;in outijs =
v2
2c
+ v  c
2
2 | {z }
#
  (1  ) Qtq(s)  (i   tq)| {z }
##
; i 2 fL;Hg;
where tq =
(i + !)( v=c  )
(1 +  )(v=c+ )
:
(14)
Note that 0 <   v and 0 <  <  vc because a user would post only  vc pieces of sensitive
information in the status quo.
Recall Qtn(s) and Qtq(s) are the total quantities of information posted in the community given
participation size, s. Comparing equations (13) and (12), () is smaller than (1+ )v22c because the
nudge makes posting information more costly. However, if the targeting is suciently accurate, i.e.,
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tn is suciently large, then even if user participation increases leading to Qtn(s) > Qsq(s), the second
term in equation (13), (), can still be smaller than the second term in Equation (12), (1 )Qsq(s)i.
Hence, the targeted nudge reduces the average net privacy harm due to peer disclosure, meaning the
contradiction highlighted by equation (12) need not exist. A similar analysis applies to a targeted
quota. When tq is suciently large, a targeted quota may increase overall information contribution
but suppress privacy harm and increase social welfare.
A real-life implementation of targeted nudge is the smartphone app\ReThink"(ABC News 2015).
It alerts users when they try to post oensive words or phrases in social media. The core component
of the app is a database of oensive trigger words and phrases. In practice, such targeted information
control or nudges cannot completely accurately distinguish sensitive from non-sensitive information.
They may generate false positives { non-sensitive or non-oensive information could be wrongly
detected as sensitive or oensive information, or false negatives { omitting sensitive or oensive
information that causes harm to others. However, as long as the targeting is suciently accurate,
such approaches to regulating information contribution could help curb privacy harm and increase
social welfare. Their deployment is aligned with the interest of community owners too because, by
reducing privacy harm, more people may be willing to join online social communities which can lead
to an overall increase in information contribution.
B. Information Perturbation and Pruning
In the same spirit as the series of data perturbation techniques developed to protect privacy (e.g., Li
and Sarkar 2006; Menon and Sarkar 2007), another possible solution to addressing the peer disclosure
problem is to help users identify and prune sensitive information (e.g., automatically blurring faces or
replacing faces with emoji in photos or videos). This can directly reduce the privacy harm caused by
each piece of sensitive information and thus decrease i. Such information pruning may cause users
to obtain less pleasure in posting information, i.e., it may decrease v. Referring to equation (12), it
will decrease the user's posting benet and net privacy harm suered from others' posting. However,
as long as the pruning of sensitive information is suciently accurate to the extent that it reduces
the privacy harm (by reducing i) more than the posting benet (due to a decrease in v), then it
can be an eective solution. Arguably, blurring or substituting the faces in a picture by non-intrusive
measures could eliminate most privacy harms inicted on the involved people without signicantly
hurting the poster's pleasure.
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V. Numerical Example
We use a numerical example to demonstrate two results from the above discussion. First, we show
that a uniform quota and uniform nudge can increase social welfare and reduce privacy harm under
dierent levels of v as shown in Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 to 5. Second, we show that properly-
constructed targeted nudge, targeted quota, and information pruning can resolve the conict between
social planner and community owner as characterized in Section IV, by eectively regulating privacy
harm while increasing the number of participating users and social welfare.
Let  = 0:7,  = 0:5, n = 0:1,  = 0:5,  = 0:5,  = 0:1, e = 0:1, ! = 0:01, c = 1, L = 0:5, and
H = 1. These values describe an online social community with many strategic users facing high costs
of posting sensitive information and posting about strangers in a small friendship network. Users in
the community enjoy some recognition benets. Users not in the community face a small chance of
being aected by the privacy externality. As specied in Lemma 1, the equilibrium outcomes in the
status quo dier in ve ranges of v. We choose the average v in each of these ve ranges and construct
ve sets of outcomes in Table 2.10 In each panel of Table 2, we compare the outcomes in the status
quo with the outcomes under dierent regulations, including uniform nudge, uniform quota, targeted
nudge, targeted quota, and information pruning. For illustrative purpose, we set the uniform nudge
as 30% of the posting benet, v, and the uniform quota as 70% of the posting volume in the status
quo. We set the targeted nudge as 60% of v and targeted quota as 50% of the posting volume of
sensitive information in the status quo.11 Figure 6 plots the results under the dierent levels of v as
shown in Table 2.
Consistent with Proposition 1, a uniform nudge (UN) reduces user participation because it makes
information contribution less benecial. The total quantity of information in the community declines,
leading to less privacy harm. It may increase social welfare by driving some marginal users out as
Proposition 2 suggests. However, such welfare improvement is possible only when social welfare is
negative in the status quo, i.e., when v = 0:016 or 0:051. When social welfare is positive in the status
quo, i.e., when v = 0:168, 0:337, or 0:458, nudging decreases social welfare.
10 For the last equilibrium in Lemma 1 where both types of users participate in the community, the range of v can
extend to innity. We choose the last v in Table 2 as 2(1  )H + 0:5.
11 Note that these are not optimal nudges and quotas. The optimal nudges and quotas dier in settings with dierent
v's. We choose these values just to illustrate that the uniform and targeted nudges and quotas indeed carry the properties
and functions as analyzed in the Propositions.
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Table 2: Numerical example
(i) v = 0:016: s Q  (10 2)  (10 2)
Status Quo: 0:300 0:004 -0:018 0:100
Uniform Nudge: 0:300 0:003 -0:013 0:070
Uniform Quota: 0:300 0:003 -0:012 0:070
Targeted Nudge: 0:650 0:007 -0:003 0:100
Targeted Quota: 0:650 0:007 0:004 0:088
Information Pruning: 0:300 0:004 -0:007 0:064
(ii) v = 0:051: s Q  (10 2)  (10 2)
Status Quo: 0:475 0:020 -0:074 0:503
Uniform Nudge: 0:333 0:010 -0:036 0:246
Uniform Quota: 0:618 0:018 -0:067 0:457
Targeted Nudge: 0:650 0:021 0:022 0:316
Targeted Quota: 0:650 0:021 0:055 0:278
Information Pruning: 0:650 0:025 -0:032 0:442
(iii) v = 0:168: s Q  (10 2)  (10 2)
Status Quo: 0:650 0:090 0:107 2:248
Uniform Nudge: 0:650 0:063 -0:083 1:574
Uniform Quota: 0:650 0:063 0:233 1:574
Targeted Nudge: 0:890 0:096 0:387 1:416
Targeted Quota: 1 0:105 0:757 1:396
Information Pruning: 0:740 0:092 0:279 1:643
(iv) v = 0:337: s Q  (10 2)  (10 2)
Status Quo: 0:825 0:229 1:390 5:727
Uniform Nudge: 0:650 0:126 0:580 3:159
Uniform Quota: 1 0:194 1:467 4:860
Targeted Nudge: 1 0:217 2:229 3:193
Targeted Quota: 1 0:210 3:579 2:802
Information Pruning: 1 0:250 1:994 4:457
(v) v = 0:458: s Q  (10 2)  (10 2)
Status Quo: 1 0:378 3:237 9:446
Uniform Nudge: 0:786 0:208 1:261 5:196
Uniform Quota: 1 0:264 4:083 6:612
Targeted Nudge: 1 0:295 4:546 4:345
Targeted Quota: 1 0:286 6:885 3:813
Information Pruning: 1 0:340 4:572 6:064
Notes. s: participation size; Q: total posts; : social welfare; : total privacy harm.
By Proposition 3, a uniform quota (UQ) helps some users obtain a higher surplus and encourages
them to join the community. In our example, when v = 0:051 or 0:337, imposing a quota can increase
user participation. It also enhances social welfare in all the scenarios as suggested in Proposition 5.
However, consistent with Proposition 4, it always decreases the total quantity of information posted
in the community.
One dilemma highlighted in Section IV and particularly equation (12) is that a non-discriminatory
nudge or quota cannot simultaneously increase social welfare, decrease privacy harm, and increase
information contribution. We simulate the impacts of imposing a targeted nudge (TN) and targeted
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Figure 6: Numerical Example
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quota (TQ) as analyzed in Section 4.1. We allow the targeting technologies to be imperfect, viz. non-
sensitive information can be misclassied as sensitive (\false positive") and wrongly suppressed, and
sensitive information can be misclassied as non-sensitive (\false negative"). We set the probability
of such mis-targeting to be 10% (please refer to the Online Supplement for how we derive numerical
results for targeted nudge and quota). Furthermore, to illustrate the eect of information pruning
(IP) as analyzed in Section 4.2, we multiply v and i by discount factors of 90% and 50%.
As shown in Table 2 and Figure 6, all three targeting and pruning measures, TN, TQ, and IP, can
improve social welfare and reduce the privacy harm. They also increase total information contribution
in many scenarios (specically, TN and TQ increase total posts when v = 0:016, 0:051, and 0:168, and
IP increases total posts when v = 0:051, 0:168, and 0:337). This is achieved by attracting more users
to join the community. These numerical results are consistent with our analysis in Section IV, that
targeted information control (TN or TQ) and information pruning (IP) can help align the interests
of the social planner and community owner. They can lead to a win-win situation { increase social
welfare, decrease privacy harm, and increase total information contribution.
VI. Extensions
We assess the robustness of the above analysis by relaxing several key assumptions.
(i) Heterogeneity in \friendship". In this extension, we relax the assumption that all users must
have the same expected number of\friends". We allow for heterogeneity in users' number of friends and
assume that ni is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e., ni 2 U [0; 1]. To ensure tractability, we
let i = 1 ni 2 [0; 1], meaning that users who are less sensitive about privacy have more friends. The
justication is that users who are more privacy sensitive tend to minimize exposure of their personal
information, and restricting their friendship network is one eective means to reduce such exposure.
Previous research has shown that reciprocity is salient in social networking websites (e.g., Cha et al.
2009; Kumar et al. 2010; Weng et al. 2010), suggesting that people who share more information with
others tend to have more friends, which is consistent with our assumption. To simplify the analysis
and focus on the impact of heterogeneity in \friendship", we assume that all users are non-committed
strategic users in this extension, i.e.,  = 1. All other setups remain the same as in the main model.
The objective function for any user i with ni friends is specied in Equation (2). We characterize the
equilibrium in the status quo in the following lemma.
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Lemma 4 In the status quo, (1) when 0 < v < (1 )(1+ 1 )  e(1+ ) !1+ , users with  < o participate
in the community and users with  > o stay out of the community, where o is the solution to
v = (1 )[ 
o e(1+ ) !]o[2 (1 )o]
(1+ )[1 (1 )o] ; (2) when v  (1   )(1 + 1 )  e(1+ ) !1+ , all users participate in
the community.
It is easy to verify that o increases in v, meaning that the participation rate is increasing in the
posting benet. This is consistent with our ndings from the main model.
We next consider the impact of a nudge. Imposing a nudge reduces a user's benet from posting
each piece of information. Hence, the impact of a nudge is similar to that of reducing the posting
benet, v. As the participation rate is increasing in v, we expect that a nudge would decrease the
participation rate. Furthermore, using a numerical example reported in the Online Supplement,
we show that a nudge has similar impacts on the community's participation rate, total information
contribution, total privacy harm, and aggregate user surplus as in the main model.
The analysis of a quota is less straightforward because a uniform quota is no longer appropriate
when users adopt dierent posting strategies based on their number of friends. We consider a quota of
the following form: i = f  i(1+ )vc , where f 2 [0; 1] and i(1+ )vc is the total amount of information
that user i would post in the status quo. In other words, each user faces a dierent quota contingent on
their numbers of friends. We show in the Online Supplement that there exists a quota that (weakly)
increases the participation rate and decreases total information contribution and total privacy harm
caused by the community, and hence exhibits similar eects as the quota in the main model. We
further use numerical analysis (reported in the Online Supplement) to show that a properly-designed
quota improves the social welfare under dierent parameters.
(ii) Nonlinear externality. We consider a scenario when the externalities, e, !, and  increase with
the number of participating users. Realistically, the impact of disclosing sensitive information may
increase with the size of audience. Having more audience increases the chance that the information
resonates with interested friends or acquaintances. Let e(s) = es, !(s) = !s, L(s)  Ls, and
H(s)  Hs = s, where s 2 (0; 1) is the fraction of participating users. With these changes, the total
privacy harm that a user suers becomes a convex function.
We report the detailed equilibrium outcomes in the Online Supplement. The following lemma
characterizes users' participation incentives.
Lemma 5 When the externalities increase with the number of participating users, the non-committed
30
users are more likely to participate in the status quo.
Recall non-committed low type users join the community at a lower v than non-committed high
type users. When low type users deliberate their participation decisions, they enjoy less externality
because the size of participating users is small, i.e., s < 1. Hence, low type users will suer less
privacy harm because the community is still small and so will join when v is lower. When v increases,
some non-committed high type users will gradually join. For these early high type users, they also
suer less privacy harm and thus have more incentives to join. Here again, all of our earlier results
regarding the merits of the regulations continue to apply.
(iii) Unintended Disclosure. In our model, users make posting decisions about sensitive and
non-sensitive information, meaning they intentionally divulge others' sensitive information. In the
Online Supplement, we analyze a variant in which users make posting decisions about only one set
of information containing both sensitive and non-sensitive information. In other words, they disclose
others' sensitive information unintentionally. We assume an exogenous fraction (unknown to the user)
of the posted information causes privacy harm on others. All results in the main model continue to
apply in this new setting.
VII. Discussion and Implications
Using a stylized model, we show that regulation is necessary to control peer disclosure in an online
social community. Depending on the benet from posting information, the community may have too
many participants and the participants may post too much information about other people. Although
many countries legislate explicit privacy laws to protect consumer privacy, most of these regulations
focus on the merchant-consumer relationship involving direct privacy infringement but not third-party
privacy harm such as peer disclosure.12 In privacy disputes resulting from peer disclosure, individuals
may pursue a defamation or libel lawsuit against the insulting party. However, such cases are rare
because not every sensitive statement on social media can be considered as the basis for a defamation
or libel lawsuit. For example, the mere disclosure of the whereabouts of a person may cause the person
to lose her job because of dereliction of duties, but such disclosure does not constitute any defamation
or libel. Furthermore, suing people for oensive or disturbing messages may have a negative impact
12 For example, the European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC states that it \shall not apply to the pro-
cessing of personal data...by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity".
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on free speech (The Telegraph 2012). Practically, it is not feasible to stipulate what a person can say
about her friends and peers. Dening and sanctioning peer disclosure could be immensely dicult or
costly too. Hence, explicit legislation is not likely to be a practicable solution.
We propose two implementable policies: a nudge and quota. A carefully selected nudge and quota
can help enhance user welfare, but they work dierently. A nudge helps by driving users who are
concerned about privacy out of the community and suppressing those who participate from posting
information. A quota helps by reducing the amount of information posted by each user and hence
reducing the privacy harm and preserving participation incentives. We show that the community
owner will never prefer nudging. It mostly does not prefer a quota either except when it wants to
grow its user base. We present an important necessary condition, Proposition 8, for any regulation
to achieve the triple objectives of enhancing social welfare, reducing privacy harm, and increasing
information contribution. Based on this condition, we propose three solutions that selectively target
dierent kinds of information.
One immediate insight from our analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 is that, lacking any regulation,
some users should simply not join online social communities with mediocre benets from information
sharing (cf. the magnitude of privacy harm from peer disclosure). These users should be excluded
not because they are \harmful" to other people. Instead, it is because they are more vulnerable to
the privacy harm from peer disclosure. The practical implication is that if a person is sensitive about
privacy, she should not join online social communities with particularly intimate themes, such as those
promoting extra-marital aairs or socially improper behaviors such as drug consumption. Similarly,
users who are not ready for politically-charged discussion or abusive comments with real personal
identities should stay out from communities predominated by users who like to post information
about, confront, or abuse others.
Notwithstanding this insight, regulation is necessary to enhance the collective welfare of users in
online social communities. Our nuanced consideration of user participation and information contri-
bution helps explain why almost no online social community is eager to nudge users despite the fact
that nudging has been repeatedly advocated (Acquisti 2009; Acquisti et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2013).
It also highlights the disadvantage of imposing a quota, that it preserves users' incentives to join the
community but decreases overall information contribution.
Ideally, we want to limit the privacy harm due to peer disclosure but encourage users to par-
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ticipate in the community and contribute more information. Section 4 discusses three solutions that
either impose a nudge or quota selectively to sensitive information, or perturb or prune the sensitive
information while retaining its informational benets. Section 5 shows that these solutions can in-
crease social welfare and are aligned with the community owner's interest too. However, they require
sophisticated technologies that can identify and target sensitive personal information reasonably ac-
curately. Such technologies may be impracticable or too expensive and hence not all owners of online
social communities are willing to develop and deploy them.
Lacking an extrinsic motivation to address the privacy harm, how can the community owner be
motivated to adopt these regulatory policies (either impose a uniform nudge or quota at the cost of
less information contribution, or invest in relevant technologies to target sensitive information)? A
promising direction is to attribute part of the damage from the privacy harm to the community owner
so that it has incentives to address the harm suered by privacy-sensitive users. For example, the
regulator can help victims take legal actions and seek compensation from the owner of an online social
community when the privacy damage from peer disclosure is excessive. Such legal sanctions against
platform owners who do not directly impose the damage is not without precedents. For example, the
U.S. government has shut down MegaUpload.com, a cyberlocker helping users to download movies
or music shared by other users, because it has \contributed" to the infringement of the copyright of
aected intellectual property owners. It is common for plaintis in defamation cases to sue also the
media for vicariously contributing to the damage caused by other people (a situation highly similar
to \peer disclosure" in our setting). If the platform owner can be held liable for the information
disclosed by its users about their peers, then it should have a stronger, vested incentive to regulate
user behaviors.13
Although our analysis is framed on peer \disclosure", our insights extend to other settings where
users impose negative externalities on peers. One example is game invitations on online social com-
munities. Increasingly, games designed for mobile devices encourage players to send invitations to
friends before granting additional game credits to the players. This promotional tactic has caused
many players to invite friends to try the games, which arguably creates annoyance and inconvenience
13 Because we have not developed a utility function for the platform owner, we cannot explicitly analyze how this
allocation of damage would aect the extent of regulation and the equilibrium outcomes. We do not model the platform
owner's utility because its decision may not be driven purely by economic considerations. We defer the study of platform
owner's decisions and utility to future research.
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to peers. Although this practice does not involve disclosure, it intrudes the private space of the peers
and so threatens the seclusion aspect of privacy (Stigler 1980). As such, our analysis directly applies.
Nudging or imposing a limit on such \invitations" would help enhance the aggregate user welfare.
In fact, we contend that platform owners may have a higher incentive to nudge or cap such game
invitations because they are less vested in these promotions.
Numerous instances of externality-curbing policies exist in other peer-to-peer (P2P) applications.
For example, BitTorrent, a popular P2P le sharing protocol, reduces network trac congestion by
slowing down the download speed for free riders (Hosanagar et al. 2010). Online music streaming
services such as Spotify and Pandora have been pressed by music labels to limit free streaming access
to theirs users in order to alleviate the negative externalities imposed on paying users and musicians
(Gigaom.com 2013; The Independent 2015). Facebook has experimented with charging fees to users
who bombard celebrities with unwanted messages in order to limit the negative externalities generated
from such harassment (The Independent 2013). Our framework provides a basis for analyzing the
optimal choices of policy instruments in these applications.
A. Implementation
Given our conclusion that regulation is necessary and the identication of the properties of a good
regulatory policy, this paper has made an important rst step towards improving the privacy and
welfare for users to participate in online social communities. The next step is how to implement the
right nudges or quotas. Lacking an accurate account of privacy externality, we oer the following
guidance.
The rst step is to measure the size and privacy sensitivity of users. It may not be feasible
to directly poll users about their privacy preferences. Users may not respond to such polls and,
even if they do, their responses are likely biased because people tend to exaggerate their privacy
needs (Harper and Singleton 2001; Hui et al. 2007; Vasalou et al. 2011). One alternative way is to
infer user preferences from their activities. For example, Facebook can track the frequency of users
untagging their names from photos shared by their friends. Google can track delisting requests related
to identity removal. Such data can help construct users' privacy proles. A potential challenge with
this approach is how to account for selection bias as we can only observe the behavior of participating
users. This selection bias poses a smaller threat when the size of participating users is large relative
to non-participating users, which is likely the case for large communities such as Facebook or Google.
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Nonetheless, measuring the privacy preferences of people not taking part in online social communities
is a good topic for future research.
To set the nudge or quota levels, the community owner can gauge users' posting benet, v, using
standard marketing techniques such as conjoint analysis (e.g., Hann et al. 2007; Krasnova et al. 2009)
or eld experiments (e.g., Hui et al. 2007; Beresford et al. 2012). Users' posting cost, c, consisting of
the cost to collect and post peers' information, can be calibrated based on the nature of the community
and technological sophistication of the users. For example, users in a community of indecent aairs or
paparazzis are likely to incur a higher posting cost as the underlying content is more privacy sensitive
and dicult to obtain. By contrast, for a community targeting the mass market such as Facebook,
users tend to bear a much lower information collection and posting costs.
The implementation of a nudge or quota also requires quantication of personal information
because dierent types of personal information vary in privacy sensitivity. Previous research has
attempted to quantify the value and sensitivity of personal data (e.g., Hui et al. 2007; Hann et al.
2007). Similar methodologies can be extended to other personal data such as photos or videos. A
nudge or quota can then be applied directly to each piece of \unitized" information.
Nudging can take dierent forms in practice, such as warning messages or visual cues. As a user
gains experience, they may omit and become unresponsive to privacy nudges. To ensure the salience
of the privacy nudges, the community owner can include a time delay whenever a nudge is applied,
for example, by forcing users to read the warning messages. It can also regularly change how and
when the warning messages or cues are displayed, or the content of the messages or cues itself. By
doing so, users will less likely skip the privacy cues.
B. Limitations and Future Research
Our analysis has several limitations. First, for ease of tractability, we assume two types of users, which
allows us to show the responses of users with diering privacy sensitivity to the regulations. Future
research should extend the analysis to more heterogeneous users. It may also model homophily which
could aect how users form friendship and engage in peer disclosure.
Second, we consider the community owner's interest in maximizing user participation or posting
of information, but we have not developed its objective function. Constructing such a function may
help us gain a holistic view of social welfare and the equilibrium behaviors. The challenge lies in how
to reasonably capture the diering objectives of online social communities.
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Third, this analysis is conned to one online social community and does not consider \multi-
homing" (Koh and Fichman 2014). An interesting extension is to allow users to choose between
communities and study how their privacy preferences and peer disclosure interact.
Finally, because of complexity with interplays of many factors such as user commitment, privacy
concern, information sensitivity, costs, and the modeling of friendship network structure, we cannot
derive unambiguous comparative static analysis. Hence, we cannot conclude if, for example, having
more committed or privacy-sensitive users will favor a nudge or a quota, or whether regulation is more
or less important when the user demographic changes in a particular direction. Developing a more
parsimonious model may help overcome this diculty. However, balancing parsimony and richness of
insights is an obvious challenge.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
In 2017, the number of active users on Facebook, WeChat, Instagram, Twitter, and Pinterest were
1.97 billion, 889 million, 600 million, 319 million, and 150 million respectively (Statistica 2017).
There are around 3.2 billion Internet users. This mean that Facebook alone has more than 60% of
penetration. Evidently, these online platforms present people with novel avenues for social interaction.
New research is necessary to uncover the implications of such interaction with unprecedented reach
and scale.
This paper analyzes one novel behavior in online social communities, viz. peer disclosure of
personal information. The sharing of information among friends is mostly not regulated, but its
consequence is starting to surface. For example, there has been cases when people were sacked from
work because of friends' posting of their improper behavior in online social communities, and crime
syndicates have used data harvested from online social networks to track targeted victims. Studying
the implications of peer disclosure and its regulation is an important rst step towards shaping a
healthy online environment for social interaction. This study serves such a purpose.
We nd that regulation is necessary. The choice of regulation depends on how privacy is treated
in the jurisdiction. A nudge is helpful if privacy is absolutely preferred, whereas a quota is better if
we focus on economic utility and are willing to trade privacy for the pleasure in sharing information.
Most importantly, having more users need not be good for the society. Any thoughtful analysis of
the benets of online social communities should consider the pros and cons of user participation and
exit, and the related benets and damages, in a holistic framework.
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Appendix. A
This appendix presents the optimal quota that maximizes the aggregate user surplus. We use the
superscript  to denote the associated outcome.  is an innitesimally small positive number.
(i) When   (1  )(1  LH ):
(i.1) If 0 < v  (1  )(1  )L,  = , leading to sqL = 0, sqH = 0, and sq = 1  .
(i.2) If (1  )(1  )L < v  (1  )(1  )L,  = , leading to sqL = (v )=((1 )L) (1 )(1 ) ,
sqH = 0, and s
q = v (1 )L .
(i.3) If (1   )(1   )L < v     (1   )H ,  = , leading to sqL = 1, sqH = 0, and
sq = 1  .
(i.4) If    (1   )H < v  (1   )(2   )H   ,  = (1+ )[v +(1 )H ]c , leading to
sqL = 1, s
q
H = 0, and s
q = 1  .
(i.5) If (1  )(2  )H    < v  2(1  )(1  )H ,  = 2(1+ )[v (1 )(1 )H ]c , leading
to sqL = 1, s
q
H = 0, and s
q = 1  .
(i.6) If 2(1   )(1   )H < v  2(1   )H   ,  = (1+ )vc , leading to sqL = 1, sqH =
v=(2(1 )H) (1 )
 , and s
q = v2(1 )H .
(i.7) If v > maxf2(1   )(1   )H ; 2(1   )H   g,  = (1+ )(v )c , leading to sqL = 1,
sqH = 1, and s
q = 1.
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(ii) When  > (1  )(1  LH ):
(ii.1) If 0 < v  (1  )(1  )L,  = , leading to sqL = 0, sqH = 0, and sq = 1  .
(ii.2) If (1  )(1 )L < v  (1  )(1 )L,  = , leading to sqL = (v )=((1 )L) (1 )(1 ) ,
sqH = 0, and s
q = v (1 )L .
(ii.3) If (1   )(1   )L < v  (1   )(1   )H ,  = , leading to sqL = 1, sqH = 0, and
sq = 1  .
(ii.4) If (1 )(1 )H < v  (1 )H ,  = , leading to sqL = 1, sqH = (v )=((1 )H) (1 ) ,
and sq = v (1 )H .
(ii.5) If (1  )H < v  ,  = , leading to sqL = 1, sqH = 1, and sq = 1.
(ii.6) If v > ,  = (1+ )(v 
)
c , leading to s
q
L = 1, s
q
H = 1, and s
q = 1.
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I. Omitted Proofs in the Main Model
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that usq,ini|s > u
sq,out
i|s is equivalent to u
sq,in−out
i|s ≡ usq,ini|s − usq,outi|s > 0.
We can easily derive usq,in−outi|s =
γ(1+ψ)v
2c [v − 2(1 − )sλi], i ∈ {L,H}. Note that usq,in−outi|s decreases
in s and λi. Then any potential equilibrium can be characterized by one of the following 5 cases:
(1) usq,in−outH|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s < 0, (2) u
sq,in−out
H|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s = 0, (3) u
sq,in−out
H|s < 0 < u
sq,in−out
L|s , (4)
usq,in−outH|s = 0 < u
sq,in−out
L|s , or (5) 0 < u
sq,in−out
H|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s . In the following, we derive the conditions
for each equilibrium. Q denotes the total information, Π denotes the social welfare, ξ denotes the total
objective privacy damage and ξ′ denotes the total perceived privacy damage. The superscript sq indicates
the status quo.
(1) If usq,in−outH|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s < 0, then no non-committed user will prefer to join, implying the
equilibrium s is ssq = 1 − α (i.e., only committed users join). Substituting s = 1 − α into usq,in−outH|s <
usq,in−outL|s < 0, we get v < 2(1 − )(1 − α)λL, which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the
existence of this equilibrium. Accordingly, Qsq = (1−α)γ(1+ψ)vc , Π
sq = (1−α)γ(1+ψ)v2c [v − 2(1− α+ α)λ¯],
ξsq = (1−α)γψθ¯vc , and ξ
′sq = (1−α)γψvc [(1− α+ α)θ¯].
(2) If usq,in−outH|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s = 0, then low-type non-committed users are indifferent between
joining and not joining while high-type non-committed users prefer not to join, implying in equilibrium
ssq ∈ [1−α, 1−αβ]. Meanwhile, the condition usq,in−outL|s = 0 gives ssq = v2(1−)λL . So v2(1−)λL ∈ [1−α, 1−
αβ] leads to 2(1− )(1− α)λL ≤ v ≤ 2(1− )(1− αβ)λL, which is the sufficient and necessary condition
for the existence of this equilibrium. In this equilibrium, a fraction, ssqL , of low-type non-committed
users choose to join while the rest of low-type non-committed users choose not to join. And ssqL =
ssq−(1−α)
α(1−β) =
v/(2(1−)λL)−(1−α)
α(1−β) . Accordingly, Q
sq = γ(1+ψ)v
2
2c(1−)λL , Π
sq = r(1+ψ)v
2
2c
[
(1− α)− (1−α+α)λ¯(1−)λL
]
,
ξsq = γψθ¯v
2
2c(1−)λL , and ξ
′sq = γψv
2
2c(1−)λL [(1− α+ α)θ¯ + α(1− β)(1− )s
sq
L θL].
(3) if usq,in−outH|s < 0 < u
sq,in−out
L|s , then low-type non-committed users prefer to join while high-type
non-committed users prefer not to join, implying in equilibrium ssq = 1− αβ. Substituting s = 1− αβ
into usq,in−outH|s < 0 < u
sq,in−out
L|s , we obtain 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v < 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , which is the
sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Accordingly, Qsq = (1−αβ)γ(1+ψ)vc ,
Πsq = (1−αβ)γ(1+ψ)v2c {v− 2[λ¯− (1− )αβλH ]}, ξsq = (1−αβ)γψθ¯vc , and ξ′sq = (1−αβ)γψvc [θ¯− (1− )αβθH ].
(4) if usq,in−outH|s = 0 < u
sq,in−out
L|s , then low-type users prefer to join while high-type users are
indifferent between joining and not joining, implying in equilibrium ssq ∈ [1 − αβ, 1]. Meanwhile, the
condition usq,in−outH|s = 0 gives s
sq = v2(1−)λH . So
v
2(1−)λH ∈ [1−αβ, 1] leads to 2(1−)(1−αβ)λH ≤ v ≤
2(1− )λH , which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, a fraction, ssqH , of high-type non-committed users choose to join while the rest of high-type
non-committed users choose not to join. And ssqH =
ssq−(1−αβ)
αβ =
v/(2(1−)λH)−(1−αβ)
αβ . Accordingly,
Qsq = γ(1+ψ)v
2
2c(1−)λH , Π
sq = r(1+ψ)v
2
2c
[
1− λ¯(1−)λH
]
, ξsq = γψθ¯v
2
2c(1−)λH , and ξ
′sq = γψv
2
2c(1−)λH [θ¯ − (1 − )(1 −
ssqH )αβθH ].
(5) If 0 < usq,in−outH|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s , then all non-committed users prefer to join, implying in equilib-
rium ssq = 1. Substituting s = 1 into 0 < usq,in−outH|s < u
sq,in−out
L|s , we obtain v > 2(1− αβ)λH , which is
the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. Accordingly, Qsq = γ(1+ψ)vc ,
1
Πsq = γ(1+ψ)v2c (v − 2λ¯), ξsq = γψθ¯vc , and ξ′sq = γψθ¯vc (the same as ξsq since all users participate).
It is easy to check that Qsq(v), ξsq(v), ξ′sq(v) are both continuous and increasing in v (to see
ξ′sq(v) increases in v, one should note ssqL )(v) and s
sq
H (v) both increase in v).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, it is easy to check that Πsq(v) is continuous in v.
(1) If 0 < v < 2(1−)(1−α)λL: Πsq = (1−α)γ(1+ψ)v2c [v−2(1−α+α)λ¯] < 0 because v < 2(1−)(1−
α)λL < 2(1−α+α)λ¯. And Πsq is decreasing in v when 0 < v < min
{
2(1− )(1− α)λL, (1− α+ α)λ¯
}
and increasing in v when (1− α+ α)λ¯ < v < 2(1− )(1− α)λL.
(2) If 2(1 − )(1 − α)λL ≤ v ≤ 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λL: Πsq = r(1+ψ)v
2
2c
[
(1− α)− (1−α+α)λ¯(1−)λL
]
< 0
because (1− α)− (1−α+α)λ¯(1−)λL < 0. And obviously Πsq is decreasing in v.
(3) If 2(1− )(1−αβ)λL < v < 2(1− )(1−αβ)λH : Πsq = (1−αβ)γ(1+ψ)v2c {v−2[λ¯− (1− )αβλH ]}.
First note that 2[λ¯−(1−)αβλH ] > 2(1−)(1−αβ)λL. If  ≤ (1−β)(1− λLλH ), then 2[λ¯−(1−)αβλH ] ≤
2(1−)(1−αβ)λH , so Πsq < 0 iff 2(1−)(1−αβ)λL < v < 2[λ¯−(1−)αβλH ]; If  > (1−β)(1− λLλH ), then
2[λ¯− (1− )αβλH ] > 2(1− )(1− αβ)λH , so Πsq < 0 iff 2(1− )(1− αβ)λL < v < 2(1− )(1− αβ)λH .
And Πsq is decreasing in v iff 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v < λ¯ − (1 − )αβλH and increasing in v iff
λ¯− (1− )αβλH < v < 2(1− )(1− αβ)λH .
(4) If 2(1− )(1−αβ)λH ≤ v ≤ 2(1− )λH : Πsq = r(1+ψ)v
2
2c
[
1− λ¯(1−)λH
]
. If  ≤ (1−β)(1− λLλH ),
then 1− λ¯(1−)λH > 0, so Πsq > 0 and is increasing in v; If  > (1− β)(1− λLλH ), then 1− λ¯(1−)λH < 0, so
Πsq < 0 and is decreasing in v.
(5) If v > 2(1 − )λH : Πsq = γ(1+ψ)v2c (v − 2λ¯). If  ≤ (1 − β)(1 − λLλH ), then 2λ¯ ≤ 2(1 − )λH , so
Πsq > 0; If  > (1− β)(1− λLλH ), then 2λ¯ > 2(1− )λH , so Πsq < 0 iff 2(1− )λH < v < 2λ¯. And Πsq is
decreasing in v iff 2(1− )λH < v < λ¯ and increasing in v iff v > max{λ¯, 2(1− )λH}.
Lemma 2 summarizes (1) through (5) above. If  ≤ (1−β)(1− λLλH )⇔ β ≤
(1−)λH−λL
λH−λL , condition
(1), (2), and (3) together yield Πsq < 0 iff 0 < v < 2[λ¯ − (1 − )αβλH ]; if  > (1 − β)(1 − λLλH ) ⇔
β > (1−)λH−λLλH−λL , condition (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) together yield Π
sq < 0 iff 0 < v < 2λ¯. The two
conditions are equivalent to the conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 2.
It is also easy to check that Πsq decreases in v only when Πsq < 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. To obtain the equilibrium outcomes here, we follow the exact same approach in
Proof of Lemma 1. Nothing that the impact of a nudge is basically a linear reduction in v, we can easily
obtain Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that the impact of a nudge relative to the status quo is decreasing
v. By Lemma 1, the participation size, s, weakly increases with v in the status quo, so decreasing v
would (weakly) reduce the participation rate in the community. Similarly, by Proof of Lemma 1, the
total amount of information and the total privacy damage both increase with v in the status quo, so
decreasing v would reduce the total information and total privacy damage.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the Proof of Lemma 2, the social welfare in the status quo may decrease
with v when it is negative, but the social welfare always increases with v when it is positive. So when
2
the social welfare in the status quo is positive, imposing a positive nudge (i.e., decreasing v) would
decrease the social welfare; when the social welfare in the status quo is negative, imposing a positive
nudge (i.e., decreasing v) may increase the social welfare, but the maximum welfare is obviously zero,
which is achieved by setting a sufficiently costly nudge τ = v.
Proof of Proposition 3. When user i makes decisions about the four types of postings, we can define
a Lagrange function as the following (ignoring the externality terms since they are not user i’s decisions)
Φ(xij , yij , xik, yik, κ) =n
(
vxij −
cx2ij
2
+ vyij −
cy2ij
2ψ
)
+ (1− n)
(
vxik − cx
2
ik
2δ
+ vyik − cy
2
ik
2δψ
)
+ κ[n(xij + yij) + (1− n)(xik + yik)− Λ],
where κ is the Lagrange multiplier. The FOCs are:
∂
∂xij
Φ = n(v − cxij) + nκ = 0,
∂
∂yij
Φ = n(v − c
ψ
yij) + nκ = 0,
∂
∂xik
Φ = (1− n)(v − c
δ
xik) + (1− n)κ = 0,
∂
∂yik
Φ = (1− n)(v − c
δψ
yik) + (1− n)κ = 0,
∂
∂κ
Φ = n(xij + yij) + (1− n)(xik + yik)− Λ = 0.
Then we can easily derive: xqij =
Λ
(1+ψ)γ , y
q
ij =
ψΛ
(1+ψ)γ , x
q
ik =
δΛ
(1+ψ)γ and y
q
ik =
δψΛ
(1+ψ)γ , where γ =
n+ (1− n)δ. Since the utility function is concave, these quantities are obviously globally optimal ones.
Substituting the above equilibrium quantities back into equation (2), we can obtain user i’s utility
from participating in the community conditional on the participation size, s:
uq,ini|s = vΛ−
cΛ2
2γ(1 + ψ)
− Λsλi. (A.1)
And user i’s utility from staying out conditional on s:
uq,outi|s = −Λsλi. (A.2)
So user i’s net utility from participating in the community is obtained by subtracting (A.2) from
(A.1),
uq,in−outi|s = vΛ−
cΛ2
2γ(1 + ψ)
− (1− )Λsλi = Λ
[
v − cΛ
2γ(1 + ψ)
− (1− )sλi
]
, i ∈ {L,H}. (A.3)
Note that uq,in−outi|s decreases in s and λi. Then any potential equilibrium can be characterized by
one of the following 5 cases: (1) uq,in−outH|s < u
q,in−out
L|s < 0, (2) u
q,in−out
H|s < u
q,in−out
L|s = 0, (3) u
q,in−out
H|s <
0 < uq,in−outL|s , (4) u
q,in−out
H|s = 0 < u
q,in−out
L|s , or (5) 0 < u
q,in−out
H|s < u
q,in−out
L|s . It is important to note that
3
the participation rate increases with the numbering of the five cases, i.e., (5) > (4) > (3) > (2) > (1)
in participation rate. We next derive the conditions (more importantly, the appropriate ranges for Λ)
under which the best participation rate is (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) respectively.
(1) If uq,in−outH|s < u
q,in−out
L|s < 0, then no non-committed user will prefer to join, implying the
equilibrium s is sq = 1 − α (i.e., only committed users join). Substituting s = 1 − α into uq,in−outH|s <
uq,in−outL|s < 0, we get v <
cΛ
2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )(1 − α)λL, which is the sufficient and necessary condition
for the existence of this equilibrium. Note that Λ is a decision variable and Λ > 0. To ensure this
equilibrium is the best one, v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )(1 − α)λL must hold for any Λ, then we must have
v ≤ (1 − )(1 − α)λL. Therefore, when v ≤ (1 − )(1 − α)λL, no Λ can attract non-committed users to
join, so sq = 1− α. By Lemma 1, in this range of v, ssq = 1− α, so no Λ can improve the participation
rate relative to the status quo.
(2) If uq,in−outH|s < u
q,in−out
L|s = 0, then low-type non-committed users are indifferent between
joining and not joining while high-type non-committed users prefer not to join, implying in equilibrium
sq ∈ [1 − α, 1 − αβ]. Meanwhile, the condition uq,in−outL|s = 0 gives sq = 1(1−)λL
[
v − cΛ2γ(1+ψ)
]
. Note
the range of sq, we obtain cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )(1 − α)λL < v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL, which is the
sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. To ensure this equilibrium is the
best one, v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) +(1− )(1−αβ)λL must hold for any Λ, thus we must have v ≤ (1− )(1−αβ)λL.
Meanwhile, cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1− )(1−α)λL < v implies v > (1− )(1−α)λL and Λ < 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−α)λL]c .
Moreover, since sq = 1(1−)λL
[
v − cΛ2γ(1+ψ)
]
, the smaller Λ, the larger sq. So to maximize sq, Λ should be
set infinitesimally close to zero, i.e., Λ? = ι, so the maximum participation size s? = v−ι(1−)λL . Therefore,
when (1 − )(1 − α)λL < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL, Λ? = ι can maximize the participation rate, and the
fraction of non-committed low type users who participate is f?L =
(v−ι)/((1−)λL)−(1−α)
α(1−β) . By Lemma 1,
in this range of v, ssq = max{1−α, v2(1−)λL } < s?, so Λ? improves the participation rate relative to the
status quo.
(3) if uq,in−outH|s < 0 < u
q,in−out
L|s , then low-type non-committed users prefer to join while high-type
non-committed users prefer not to join, implying in equilibrium sq = 1 − αβ. Substituting s = 1 − αβ
into uq,in−outH|s < 0 < u
q,in−out
L|s , we obtain
cΛ
2γ(1+ψ) + (1− )(1−αβ)λL < v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1− )(1−αβ)λH ,
which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. To ensure this
equilibrium is the best one, v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH must hold for any Λ, then we must have
v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH . Meanwhile, cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v implies v > (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL
and Λ < 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λL]c . Therefore, when (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH ,
Λ? ∈
(
0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λL]c
)
can maximize the participation rate, and only all non-committed low
type users participate (s? = 1− αβ). By Lemma 1, in this range of v, ssq = min{ v2(1−)λL , 1− αβ}. So,
when (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v ≤ min{(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λL}, ssq = v2(1−)λL < s?, Λ?
improves the participation rate relative to the status quo; when 2(1−)(1−αβ)λL < v ≤ (1−)(1−αβ)λH ,
ssq = 1− αβ = s?, Λ? does not change the participation rate relative to the status quo.
(4) If uq,in−outH|s = 0 < u
q,in−out
L|s , then low-type users prefer to join while high-type users are
indifferent between joining and not joining, implying in equilibrium ssq ∈ [1 − αβ, 1]. Meanwhile, the
condition uq,in−outH|s = 0 gives s
q = 1(1−)λH
[
v − cΛ2γ(1+ψ)
]
. Note the range of sq, we obtain cΛ2γ(1+ψ) +
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(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH < v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )λH , which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the
existence of this equilibrium. To ensure this equilibrium is the best one, v < cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )λH must
hold for any Λ, then we must have v ≤ (1− )λH . Meanwhile, cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1− )(1− αβ)λH < v implies
v > (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH and Λ < 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]c . Moreover, since sq = 1(1−)λH
[
v − cΛ2γ(1+ψ)
]
,
the smaller Λ, the larger sq. So to maximize sq, Λ should be set infinitesimally close to zero, i.e., Λ? = ι,
so the maximum participation size s? = v−ι(1−)λH . Therefore, when (1− )(1− αβ)λH < v ≤ (1− )λH ,
Λ? = ι can maximize the participation rate, and all non-committed low type users participate and the
fraction of non-committed high type users who participate is f?H =
(v−ι)/((1−)λH)−(1−αβ)
αβ . By Lemma
1, in this range of v, ssq = max{1 − αβ, v2(1−)λH } < s?, so Λ? improves the participation rate relative
to the status quo.
(5) If 0 < uq,in−outH|s < u
q,in−out
L|s , then all non-committed users prefer to join, implying in equilib-
rium sq = 1. Substituting s = 1 into 0 < uq,in−outH|s < u
q,in−out
L|s , we obtain
cΛ
2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )λH < v,
which is the sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of this equilibrium. To ensure we are
able to achieve this equilibrium, we must have v > (1 − )λH and Λ < 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c . Therefore,
when v > (1 − )λH , Λ? ∈
(
0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c
)
can maximize the participation rate, and all non-
committed users participate (s? = 1). By Lemma 1, in this range of v, ssq = min{ v2(1−)λH , 1}. So, when
(1 − )λH < v < 2(1 − )λH , ssq = v2(1−)λH < s?, Λ? improves the participation rate relative to the
status quo; when v ≥ 2(1− )λH , ssq = 1 = s?, Λ? does not change the participation rate relative to the
status quo.
Proposition 3 summarizes all the above 5 cases and highlights the conditions under which quota
can be used to improve participation rate relative to the status quo.
Proof of Proposition 4. With an effective quota Λ ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ), all users will post up to the quota.
And relative to the status quo, each individual posts less. So if an effective quota increases the total
information posted in the community relative to the status quo, it must have attracted more users to
participate in the community. However, this would never happen. We next show why it is the case.
First, given the participation size s, the total amount of information posted in the community
under a quota Λ is Qq(s) = sΛ. So equation (A.3) (i.e., a representative user i’s net utility from
participating in the community under a quota Λ) can be written as
uq,in−outi|s = vΛ−
cΛ2
2γ(1 + ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
− (1− )Qq(s)λi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii
, i ∈ {L,H}. (A.4)
Part (i) in (A.4) is user i’s net posting benefit under Λ and is less than r(1+ψ)v
2
2c due to Λ <
γ(1+ψ)v
c ,
meaning that any effective quota would make each user enjoy less net posting benefit relative to the status
quo. Now if Qq(s) is increased relative to the status quo, then Part (ii) in (A.4) is larger than in the
status quo, meaning that each user will suffer more net privacy cost. Then each user will unambiguously
enjoy less net utility from participating in the community due to the effective quota Λ relative to the
status quo (since Part (i) is smaller and Part (ii) is larger), which is in contradiction with the prerequisite
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that more users should participate relative to the status quo in order for the total information to increase.
Proof of Proposition 5.
We now derive the optimal quota to maximize social welfare, Λ∗.
(1) When 0 < v ≤ (1− )(1−α)λL: by Proposition 3, no quota can change the participation rate
in the status quo. So in any quota, no non-committed users will participate (labeled as Case A). In Case
A, the aggregate user welfare is (Λ ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ]):
ΠqA(Λ) = (1− α)
{
[v − (1− α+ α)λ¯]Λ− cΛ
2
2γ(1 + ψ)
}
. (A.5)
Note that v− (1−α+ α)λ¯ < 0 since (1−α+ α)λ¯ > (1− )(1−α)λL, and thus ΠqA(Λ) decreases in Λ.
So the welfare optimal quota is Λ∗ = ι and accordingly Πq∗ = −ι. With Λ∗ in place, no non-committed
users will participate and sq∗ = 1− α.
(2) When (1 − )(1 − α)λL < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL: By Proposition 3, the best a quota can
do is to attract a fraction of non-committed low type users to participate (labeled as Case B). In Case
B, the requirement on Λ is Λ ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−α)λL]c ]. And in equilibrium, non-committed low
type users are indifferent between participating and not participating. That is, uq,in−outL|s = 0 ⇔ v =
cΛ
2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )sqλL, where sq is the equilibrium participation rate and changes as Λ changes. Using
this equality, the aggregate user welfare in Case B can be written as
ΠqB(Λ) = (1− αβ)
{{
v − s
q
1− αβ [λ¯− (1− )αβλH ]
}
Λ− cΛ
2
2γ(1 + ψ)
}
= (1− αβ)
[
1− λ¯− (1− )αβλH
(1− )(1− αβ)λL
] [
vΛ− cΛ
2
2γ(1 + ψ)
]
.
(A.6)
Note that in (A.6), 1− λ¯−(1−)αβλH(1−)(1−αβ)λL < 0 since λ¯− (1− )αβλH > (1− )(1− αβ)λL, and thus Π
q
B(Λ)
decreases in Λ. Case A is also achievable but it obviously cannot do better than Case B.
So the welfare optimal quota is also Λ∗ = ι and accordingly Πq∗ = −ι. With Λ∗ in place, only a
fraction of non-committed low type users will participate and sq∗ = v−ι(1−)λL .
(3) When (1− )(1−αβ)λL < v ≤ (1− )(1−αβ)λH : By Proposition 3, the best a quota can do
is to attract all the non-committed low type users (labeled as Case C). In Case C, the requirement on Λ
is Λ ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λL]c ). The aggregate user welfare in Case C is
ΠqC(Λ) = (1− αβ)
{
[v − (λ¯− (1− )αβλH)]Λ− cΛ
2
2γ(1 + ψ)
}
. (A.7)
We can easily derive the welfare optimal quota according to (A.7) is
Λ∗C =

γ(1+ψ)[v−λ¯+(1−)αβλH ]
c , if v > λ¯− (1− )αβλH ;
ι, if v ≤ λ¯− (1− )αβλH .
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Accordingly,
Πq∗C =

(1−αβ)γ(1+ψ)[v−λ¯+(1−)αβλH ]2
2c , if v > λ¯− (1− )αβλH ;
−ι, if v ≤ λ¯− (1− )αβλH .
Case A or B is also achievable but they obviously cannot do better than Case C. Note that
λ¯− (1− )αβλH > (1− )(1− αβ)λL, so the optimal quota in this case can be expressed as:
Λ∗ =
ι, if (1− )(1− α)λL < v ≤ λ¯− (1− )αβλH .γ(1+ψ)[v−λ¯+(1−)αβλH ]
c , if λ¯− (1− )αβλH < v ≤ (1− )(1− αβ)λH ;
(A.8)
The second case exists only if λ¯− (1− )αβλH < (1− )(1−αβ)λH ⇔  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ). With Λ∗ in
place, only all non-committed low type users will participate and sq∗ = 1− αβ.
(4) (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH < v ≤ (1 − )λH : By Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to
attract all the non-committed low type users and a fraction of non-committed high type users (labeled
as Case D). In Case D, the requirement on Λ is Λ ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]c ). And in equilibrium,
non-committed high type users are indifferent between participating and not participating. That is,
uq,in−outH|s = 0 ⇔ v = cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )sqλH , where sq is the equilibrium participation rate and changes
as Λ changes. Using this equality, the aggregate user welfare in Case D can be written as
ΠqD(Λ) = (v − sλ¯)Λ−
cΛ2
2γ(1 + ψ)
=
[
1− λ¯
(1− )λH
] [
vΛ− cΛ
2
2γ(1 + ψ)
]
. (A.9)
Note that  > (1−β)(1− λLλH )⇔ λ¯ > (1− )λH ⇔ 1− λ¯(1−)λH < 0, so when  > (1−β)(1− λLλH ), Π
q
D(Λ)
decreases in Λ; when  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ), Π
q
D(Λ) increases in Λ ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ]. Therefore, we can derive
the welfare optimal quota according to (A.9)
Λ∗D =
ι, if  > (1− β)(1−
λL
λH
);
2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]
c , if  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ).
(A.10)
• When  > (1 − β)(1 − λLλH ), Case C, B, or A obviously cannot do better than Case D. So the
optimal quota is Λ∗ = ι, and all non-committed low type and a fraction of non-committed high type
users will participate and sq∗ = v−ι(1−)λH .
• When  ≤ (1 − β)(1 − λLλH ), the optimal quota Λ∗D in equation (A.10) degenerates to Case
C wherein only all the non-committed low type users participate (because Λ∗D is the corner solution).
Moreover, we need to consider when v > 2(1− )(1− αβ)λH ⇔ γ(1+ψ)vc < 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]c , the
corner solution is not achievable.
Under  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ), consider:
(4.1) If (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH < v ≤ min{(1 − )λH , 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH}, we need to compare the
corner solution with the interior solution in Case C to see when the interior solution is achievable (if yes,
the interior solution is globally optimal; if not the corner solution is globally optimal) (Case B or A is
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obviously inferior). It is easy to obtain that
Λ∗ =

γ(1+ψ)[v−λ¯+(1−)αβλH ]
c , if v ≤ (1− )(2− αβ)λH − λ¯
2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]
c , if v > (1− )(2− αβ)λH − λ¯.
(A.11)
With Λ∗ in place, only all non-committed low type users will participate and sq∗ = 1− αβ.
(4.2) If 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH < v ≤ (1 − )λH , Case C is not achievable now. Moreover, (A.9) is
increasing in Λ ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)c ], so Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)c and is ineffective. With Λ∗ in place, all non-committed low
type users and a fraction of non-committed high type users will participate and sq∗ = v2(1−)λH .
(5) When v > (1 − )λH : By Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract all the non-
committed users (labeled as Case E). In Case E, the requirement on Λ is Λ ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c ].
The aggregate user welfare in Case E is
ΠqE(Λ) = (v − λ¯)Λ−
cΛ2
2γ(1 + ψ)
. (A.12)
Note that  > (1− β)(1− λLλH )⇔ λ¯ > (1− )λH . We can derive the welfare optimal quota according to
(A.12).
• When  > (1− β)(1− λLλH ),
Λ∗E =
ι, if v ≤ λ¯;γ(1+ψ)(v−λ¯)
c , if v > λ¯.
(A.13)
It is easy to check Λ∗E is indeed globally optimal. So Λ
∗ is expressed as in (A.13). With Λ∗, all non-
committed users will participate.
• When  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ),
Λ∗E =

2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]
c , if v ≤ 2(1− )λH − λ¯;
γ(1+ψ)(v−λ¯)
c , if v > 2(1− )λH − λ¯.
(A.14)
We need to see if Case E is globally optimal quota. Under  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ), consider:
(5.1) If (1− )λH < v < min{2(1− )(1− αβ)λH , 2(1− )λH − λ¯}: in this case Λ∗E is the corner
solution and can be easily proved to be inferior to Case C. Then similar analysis as in (4.1) would yield
Λ∗ =

γ(1+ψ)[v−λ¯+(1−)αβλH ]
c , if v ≤ (1− )(2− αβ)λH − λ¯
2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]
c , if v > (1− )(2− αβ)λH − λ¯.
(A.15)
With Λ∗ in place, only all non-committed low type users will participate and sq∗ = 1− αβ.
(5.2) If max{(1− )λH , 2(1− )(1− αβ)λH} ≤ v ≤ 2(1− )λH − λ¯, in this case Λ∗E is the corner
solution and can be easily proved to be inferior to the status quo (Case C is not achievable now). So
Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)c and is ineffective. With Λ
∗ in place, all non-committed low type users and a fraction of
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non-committed high type users will participate and sq∗ = v2(1−)λH .
(5.3) If v > max{2(1− )(1−αβ)λH , 2(1− )λH − λ¯}, in this case Λ∗E is the interior solution and
is indeed globally optimal. That is, Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)(v−λ¯)c . With Λ
∗ in place, all non-committed users will
participate and sq∗ = 1.
Appendix A in the main manuscript summarizes all the above (1) through (5). We present the
optimal quotas separately according to the value of . We have also combined adjacent ranges of v under
which the optimal quotas are common.
Lastly, it is easy to check that except for conditions (4.2) and (5.2), all the optimal quotas identified
above are effective, i.e., Λ∗ < γ(1+ψ)vc . Also note that when the quota is ineffective (i.e., Λ =
γ(1+ψ)v
c ), the
quota is equivalent the status quo. In the process of searching for the optimal quota above, the ineffective
quota has also been considered. So when optimal quota is effective, then it will always improve the welfare
relative to the status quo. In conditions (4.2) and (5.2), which can be combined to be  ≤ (1−β)(1− λLλH )
and 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH < v < 2(1 − )λH − λ¯, the optimal quota is ineffective. That is, Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)vc
and the optimal quota retains the status quo.
It is easy to check that the participation rate in the community is weakly improved relative to
the status quo. The aggregate privacy damage ξ = ψθ¯1+ψQ. When the optimal quota is effective, by
Proposition 4, it will always reduce the total amount of information in the community (i.e., Q), so it will
always reduce the aggregate privacy damage.
Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 1, a positive nudge weakly reduces the participation rate
relative to the status quo. Meanwhile, by Proposition 3, quota can be used to improve the participation
rate relative to the status quo in some ranges. So obviously, a quota weakly dominates a nudge in
increasing user participation.
Now consider welfare, we separate into two cases according to the value of :
• When  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ): By Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, Πn∗ = 0 when 0 < v < 2[λ¯− (1−
)αβλH ] and Π
n∗ = Πsq when v ≥ 2[λ¯− (1− )αβλH ]. Meanwhile, by Proposition 5 (and its proof) and
Appendix A, Πq∗ = 0 when 0 < v < λ¯ − (1 − )αβλH and Πq∗ ≥ Πsq when v ≥ λ¯ − (1 − )αβλH . So
Πq∗ ≥ Πn∗.
• When  > (1 − β)(1 − λLλH ): By Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, Πn∗ = 0 when 0 < v < 2λ¯ and
Πn∗ = Πsq when v ≥ 2λ¯. Meanwhile, by Proposition 5 (and its proof) and Appendix A, Πq∗ = 0 when
0 < v < λ¯ and Πq∗ > Πsq when v ≥ λ¯. So Πq∗ ≥ Πn∗.
A technical issue worth clarifying here: we consider an extremely costly nudge (i.e., τ = v and
thus Πn = 0) equivalent to an extremely harsh quota (i.e., Λ = ι and thus Πq = −ι). This is purely
because we have assumed Λ 6= 0 to avoid some trivial discussion.
Section 3.3.5. Formal results about overlapping of participation-optimal and welfare-
optimal quotas. When the community owner’s objective is to maximize participation, by Proposition
3, a quota can be used to achieve this goal. We now examine when the welfare-optimal quota (Λ∗)
overlaps with the participation-optimal quota (Λ?). Referring to Proposition 3 and Appendix A in the
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main manuscript,
(i) When  ≤ (1− β)(1− λLλH ):
(i.1) If 0 < v ≤ (1− )(1− α)λL, Λ∗ = ι, Λ? ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ], and thus Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
(i.2) If (1− )(1− α)λL < v ≤ (1− )(1− αβ)λL, Λ∗ = ι, Λ? = ι, and thus Λ∗ = Λ?.
(i.3) If (1− )(1− αβ)λL < v ≤ λ¯− (1− )αβλH , Λ∗ = ι, Λ? ∈
(
0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λL]c
)
, and
thus Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
(i.4) If λ¯ − (1 − )αβλH < v ≤ (1 − )(2 − αβ)λH − λ¯, Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)[v−λ¯+(1−)αβλH ]c . Λ? ∈(
0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λL]c
)
when v < min{(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λL}, so Λ∗ ∈ Λ?;
Λ? ∈
(
0, γ(1+ψ)vc
)
when 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v < (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , so Λ∗ ∈ Λ?; Λ? = ι when
(1− )(1− αβ)λH < v < (1− )(2− αβ)λH − λ¯, so Λ∗ 6= Λ?.
(i.5) If (1 − )(2 − αβ)λH − λ¯ < v ≤ 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , Λ∗ = 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λH ]c . Λ? = ι
when (1 − )(2 − αβ)λH − λ¯ < v < (1 − )λH , so Λ∗ 6= Λ?; Λ? ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c ] when
max{(1− )(2− αβ)λH − λ¯, (1− )λH} < v ≤ 2(1− )(1− αβ)λH , so Λ∗ 6= Λ?.
(i.6) If 2(1− )(1−αβ)λH < v ≤ 2(1− )λH − λ¯, Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)vc . Λ? = ι when 2(1− )(1−αβ)λH <
v < (1−)λH , so Λ∗ 6= Λ?; Λ? ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c ] when max{2(1−)(1−αβ)λH , (1−)λH} <
v ≤ 2(1− )λH − λ¯, so Λ∗ 6= Λ?.
(i.7) If v > max{2(1−)(1−αβ)λH , 2(1−)λH−λ¯}, Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)(v−λ¯)c . Λ? ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c ]
when max{2(1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , 2(1 − )λH − λ¯} < v < 2(1 − )λH , so Λ∗ ∈ Λ?; Λ? ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ]
when v > 2(1− )λH , so Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
(ii) When  > (1− β)(1− λLλH ):
(ii.1) If 0 < v ≤ (1− )(1− α)λL, Λ∗ = ι, Λ? ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ], and thus Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
(ii.2) If (1− )(1− α)λL < v ≤ (1− )(1− αβ)λL, Λ∗ = ι, Λ? = ι, and thus Λ∗ = Λ?.
(ii.3) If (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH , Λ∗ = ι, Λ? ∈
(
0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)(1−αβ)λL]c
)
,
and thus Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
(ii.4) If (1− )(1− αβ)λH < v ≤ (1− )λH , Λ∗ = ι, Λ? = ι, and thus Λ∗ = Λ?.
(ii.5) If (1− )λH < v ≤ λ¯, Λ∗ = ι, Λ? ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c ], and thus Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
(ii.6) If v > λ¯, Λ∗ = γ(1+ψ)(v−λ¯)c . Λ
? ∈ (0, 2γ(1+ψ)[v−(1−)λH ]c ] when λ¯ < v < 2(1 − )λ, and thus
Λ∗ ∈ Λ?; Λ? ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ] when v > 2(1− )λH , so Λ∗ ∈ Λ?.
Proof of Proposition 7. Given a free allowance Λ˜ ∈ (0, γ(1+ψ)vc ], if a user i doesn’t post in excess
of this Λ˜, then the equilibrium quantities will be just the same as those in a pure quota. So by Proof
of Proposition 3, we have xij =
Λ
(1+ψ)γ , yij =
ψΛ
(1+ψ)γ , xik =
δΛ
(1+ψ)γ and yik =
δψΛ
(1+ψ)γ . If user i
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posts in excess of the free allowance, then she will face additional nudging cost for the excessive part of
information.
Denote the amount of non-sensitive information user i would post about user j as xcij . If user i
decides to post in excess of Λ˜, she makes the following decision: xcij = arg maxxij> Λ(1+ψ)γ
vxij − cx
2
ij
2 −
τ˜ [xij− Λ(1+ψ)γ ] = v−τ˜c . Similarly, we derive the optimal quantities of the other three types of information:
ycij =
ψ(v−τ˜)
c , x
c
ik =
δ(v−τ˜)
c , and y
c
ik =
ψδ(v−τ˜)
c . So the total amount of information each user would post
is Qc = n(xcij + y
c
ij) + (1− n)(xcik + ycik) = γ(1+ψ)(v−τ˜)c . So if Qc = γ(1+ψ)(v−τ˜)c > Λ˜, then users will post
in excess of the free allowance, otherwise they just use up the free allowance.
We now see, when users post in excess of the free allowance (i.e., γ(1+ψ)(v−τ˜)c > Λ˜ ⇔ τ˜ <
v − cΛ˜γ(1+ψ) ), whether the composite policy will outperform the pure quota in terms of participation and
welfare.
Substituting the equilibrium quantities of information derived above back into equation (2) and
(3) in the main manuscript, we can derive a representative user i’s net utility from participating in the
community condition on participation size s
uc,in−outi|s =
γ(1 + ψ)(v − τ˜)
2c
[v − τ˜ − 2(1− )sλi] + τ˜ Λ˜. (A.16)
We calculate ∂uc,in−outi|s /∂τ˜ =
γ(1+ψ)
c [(1 − )sλi + τ˜ − v] + Λ˜ for later use in the proof. We next
first prove that the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate better than a pure quota.
(i) When 0 < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − α)λL: Obviously, ∂uc,in−outi|s /∂τ˜ > 0. Note that τ˜ < v − cΛ˜γ(1+ψ) ,
so uc,in−outi|s < u
c,in−out
i|s,τ=v− cΛ˜
γ(1+ψ)
= Λ˜
[
v − cΛ˜2γ(1+ψ) − (1− )sλi
]
. The last term is user i’s net utility in
the pure quota. So each user would obtain less net utility from participating in the community in this
composite policy than in the pure quota and thus this composite policy cannot improve the participation
rate better than a pure quota.
(ii) When (1 − )(1 − α)λL < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL: By Proposition 3, the best a quota can
do is to attract a fraction of non-committed low type users to participate and uq,in−outL|s = 0 ⇔ v =
cΛ
2γ(1+ψ) + (1− )sλL, which implies ∂uc,in−outL|s /∂τ˜ = γ(1+ψ)τ˜c + Λ˜2 > 0. Similar logic in (i) yields that low
type users obtain less net utility from participating in the community in this composite policy than in
the pure quota. But for the composite policy to improve the participation rate better than a pure quota,
it should make low type users obtain at least the same net utilities. A contradiction. So the composite
policy cannot improve the participation rate better than a pure quota.
(iii) When (1 − )(1 − αβ)λL < v ≤ (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH : By Proposition 3, the best a quota can
do is to attract all the non-committed low type users. Obviously, ∂uc,in−outH|s /∂τ˜ > 0. Similar logic in (i)
yields that high type users obtain less net utility from participating in the community in this composite
policy than in the pure quota. But for the composite policy to improve the participation rate better
than a pure quota, it should make high type users obtain more net utilities. A contradiction. So the
composite policy cannot improve the participation rate better than a pure quota.
(iv) When (1 − )(1 − αβ)λH < v ≤ (1 − )λH : By Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to
attract all the non-committed low type users and a fraction of non-committed high type users. Moreover,
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uq,in−outH|s = 0 ⇔ v = cΛ2γ(1+ψ) + (1 − )sλH , which implies ∂uc,in−outH|s /∂τ˜ = γ(1+ψ)τ˜c + Λ˜2 > 0. Similar
logic in (i) yields that high type users obtain less net utility from participating in the community in
this composite policy than in the pure quota. But for the composite policy to improve the participation
rate better than a pure quota, it should at least make high type users obtain the same net utilities. A
contradiction. So the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate better than a pure quota.
(v) When v > (1 − )λH : By Proposition 3, the best a quota can do is to attract all the non-
committed users. So no way for the composite policy to improve the participation rate better than the
pure quota.
In summary, the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate better than the pure
quota.
Now consider the welfare, now that the composite policy cannot improve the participation rate
better than the pure quota, we just need to see if the composite policy can improve the welfare better than
the pure quota when it produces a lower participation rate than the pure quota. But this is impossible
because the welfare-optimal quota identified in Proposition 5, by construction, considers all the possible
participation rates and then select the right participation rate that can produce the optimal welfare. In
other words, if there indeed exists a lower participation rate that can allows the composite policy to
outperform the pure quota, the pure quota can also achieve it without the additional nudging and thus
deliver a larger welfare.
We can also prove such composite policy will not increase the total quantity of information posted
in the community when compared with the status quo. To do so, we only need to see, when users post
in excess of the free allowance (i.e., γ(1+ψ)(v−τ˜)c > Λ˜), whether the composite policy will increase total
information relative to the status quo.
User i’s net utility in (A.16) can be written as
uc,in−outi|s =
γ(1 + ψ)(v − τ˜)2
2c
+ τ˜ Λ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
− (1− )Qc(s)λi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii
. (A.17)
Part (i) in (A.17) is less than γ(1+ψ)v
2
c due to Λ˜ <
γ(1+ψ)(v−τ˜)
c , implying each user still enjoy less net
utility in this composite policy compared with in the status quo. Part (ii) in (A.17) is the net privacy
cost user i suffers (Qc(s) is the total amount of information posted in the community in this composite
policy). So the same contradiction as in the Proof of Proposition 4 will also occur here. Therefore, this
composite policy cannot increase total information relative to the status quo either.
Proof of Proposition 8. Proof of Proposition 8 is evident from the discussion that accompanies
Proposition 8 in the main manuscript.
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II. Detailed Results in Numerical Example and Extensions
A. Numerical Example
Here we explain how we derive users’ posting quantities in the targeted nudge and quota mechanisms
when “false positive” and “false negative” are allowed. Denote the probability of “false positive” as px
and the probability of “false negative” as py. Note that only detected “sensitive information” would be
regulated by nudge or quota.
In targeted nudging, user i’s net utility is
utn,in−outi|s =n
[
vxij −
cx2ij
2
+ vyij −
cy2ij
2ψ
− τ(pxxij + (1− py)yij)
]
+ (1− n)
[
vxik − cx
2
ik
2δ
+ vyik − cy
2
ik
2δψ
−τ(pxxik + (1− py)yik)] + (1− )(eQ−i + ωX·i − θiY·i).
FOCs w.r.t this equation would give user i’s optimal posting quantities in targeted nudging,
xtnij =
v − pxτ
c
, ytnij =
ψ[v − (1− py)τ ]
c
, xtnik =
δ(v − pxτ)
c
, ytnik =
ψδ[v − (1− py)τ ]
c
.
In targeted quota, user i’s net utility is
utq,in−outi|s =n
[
vxij −
cx2ij
2
+ vyij −
cy2ij
2ψ
]
+ (1− n)
[
vxik − cx
2
ik
2δ
+ vyik − cy
2
ik
2δψ
]
+ (1− )(eQ−i + ωX·i − θiY·i),
with the constraint n[pxxij + (1− py)yij ] + (1− n)[pxxik + (1− py)yik] = Λ
As in the Proof of Proposition 3, we can define a Lagrange function to derive user i’s optimal
posting quantities in targeted quota,
xtqij =
[
1− px + ψ(1− py)
px + ψ(1− py)2/px
]
v
c
+
Λ
[px + ψ(1− py)2/px]γ ,
ytqij =
[
1− px + ψ(1− py)
p2x/(1− py) + ψ(1− py)
]
ψv
c
+
ψΛ
[p2x/(1− py) + ψ(1− py)]γ
,
xtqik =
[
1− px + ψ(1− py)
px + ψ(1− py)2/px
]
δv
c
+
δΛ
[px + ψ(1− py)2/px]γ ,
ytqik =
[
1− px + ψ(1− py)
p2x/(1− py) + ψ(1− py)
]
δψv
c
+
δψΛ
[p2x/(1− py) + ψ(1− py)]γ
.
In the numerical example, we set px = py = 0.1 and fix all other exogenous parameters, including
the values for τ in targeted nudge and Λ in targeted quota (see specific values in the main text). We
choose six different values of v. For each v, using all the fixed parameters, we can compute each user’s
optimal posting quantities according to the equations derived above. Then we substitute the optimal
posting quantities back into each user’s net utility function to determine their participation decisions.
Finally, all the aggregate measures (i.e., total quantity of information posted, social welfare, and total
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privacy damage) can be calculated once participation rate is determined.
B. Extensions
(i) Heterogeneity in “friendship”. We assume ni ∈ U [0, 1] and θi = 1−ni, then λi = ψθi−e(1+ψ)−ω1+ψ ,
γi = ni + (1−ni)δ = 1− (1− δ)θi. User i’s net utility from participating in the community in the status
quo (conditional on the total information posted in the community Qsq) is given by
usq,in−outi =
γi(1 + ψ)v
2
2c
− (1− )Qsqλi (A.18)
Note that usq,in−outi in Equation (A.18) decreases in θi because γi decreases in θi and λi increases
with θi. So less privacy sensitive (more connected) users are more likely to participate. That means we
can characterize equilibrium participation rate by a cutoff user type (θo) such that users with privacy
sensitivity below θo will participate in the community and the others will not. So θo indicates the
equilibrium participation rate in the community.
Note also that the utility function in Equation (A.18) increases with v. As v becomes sufficiently
large, every user will get positive net utility and thus participate in the community, which implies θo = 1.
Now focus on θo < 1, then the condition to solve for θo is that the cutoff type has a net utility of zero:
usq,in−outi (θ
o) =
γi(θ
o)(1 + ψ)v2
2c
− (1− )Qsq(θo)λi(θo) = 0 (A.19)
The total quantity of information posted in the community in equilibrium conditional on θo is
given by
Qsq(θo) =
∫ θo
0
γi(θi)(1 + ψ)v
c
dθi = θ
o[1− 1− δ
2
θo]
(1 + ψ)v
c
(A.20)
Combining Equation (A.19) and (A.20), we can derive the condition to solve for θo:
v =
(1− )[ψθo − e(1 + ψ)− ω]θo[2− (1− δ)θo]
(1 + ψ)[1− (1− δ)θo] (A.21)
RHS of Equation (A.21) is a strictly increasing function of θo because ψθo − e(1 + ψ) − ω > 0
and increases with θo, θo[2− (1− δ)θo] > 0 and increases with θo, and 1− (1− δ)θo > 0 and decreases
with θo. So as v increases, θo will increase. But note the condition of θo < 1, which requires v <
(1− )(1 + 1δ )ψ−e(1+ψ)−ω1+ψ . When v ≥ (1− )(1 + 1δ )ψ−e(1+ψ)−ω1+ψ , then all users will get positive net utility
and participate in the community. So we obtain Lemma xx.
Nudge
Note that the impact of a nudge relative to the status quo is decreasing v. So according to Lemma
xx, implementing a nudge will (weakly) decrease participate rate relative to the status quo. According
to Equation (A.20), it is easy to verify that Qsq(θo) increases with v and θo. That is, the total quantity
of information posted in the community will decrease as posting benefit decreases and participation rate
decreases, which are the impacts from a nudge. To examine the impact of a nudge on social welfare, we
first derive the social welfare in the status quo:
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Πsq =
∫ θo
0
[
γi(θi)(1 + ψ)v
2
2c
−Qsq(θo)λi(θi)
]
dθi +
∫ 1
θo
[−Qsq(θo)λi(θi)]dθi
=
(1 + ψ)v
c
θo[1− 1− δ
2
θo]
{[
v
2
− ψ(θ
o)2
2(1 + ψ)
+ (e+
ω
1 + ψ
)θo
]
−
(1− θo)
[
ψ(1 + θo)
2(1 + ψ)
− (e+ ω
1 + ψ
)
]} (A.22)
Note the equality between θo and v in Equation (A.21). So Πsq can be viewed as a function of θo-
the equilibrium participation rate. The function in Equation (A.22) is obviously a highly non-monotonic
function. Figure A.1 illustrates this via an example with ψ = 0.5,  = 0.01, e = 0.01, ω = 0.01, δ = 0.5
and c = 1 (similar to Figure 3 in the main text). As participation rate increases, the social welfare may
decrease. Therefore, we have shown numerically that, when a nudge is implemented, the participation
rate decreases, which may result in increase in social welfare. This result shows that the effects of a
nudge is similar to that in the main model.
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Figure A.1: Social welfare as a function of participation rate in status quo
Quota
We consider a quota of the following form: Λi = f · γi(1+ψ)vc , where f ∈ [0, 1] and γi(1+ψ)vc is the
total amount of information user i will post by her own choice in the status quo. User i’s net utility
from participating in the community under the quota (conditional on the total information posted in the
community Qq) is given by
uq,in−outi = vΛi −
cΛ2i
2γi(1 + ψ)
− (1− )Qqλi (A.23)
uq,in−outi in Equation (A.23) decreases in θi because vΛi− cΛ
2
i
2γi(1+ψ)
decreases in θi (this in turn is
because vΛi − cΛ
2
i
2γi(1+ψ)
increases with Λi and Λi decreases with θi) and λi increases with θi. So we can
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again characterize equilibrium participation rate by a cutoff user type (θo) such that users with privacy
sensitivity below θo will participate in the community and the others will not.
Focus on θo < 1, then the condition to solve for θo is that the cutoff type has a net utility of zero:
uq,in−outi (θ
o) = vΛi(θ
o)− cΛi(θ
o)2
2γi(θo)(1 + ψ)
− (1− )Qq(θo)λi(θo) = 0 (A.24)
And the total quantity of information posted in the community in equilibrium conditional on θo
is given by
Qq(θo) =
∫ θo
0
f
γi(θi)(1 + ψ)v
c
dθi = fθ
o[1− 1− δ
2
θo]
(1 + ψ)v
c
(A.25)
Combining Equation (A.24) and (A.25), we can derive the condition to solve for θo:
(2− f)v = (1− )[ψθ
o − e(1 + ψ)− ω]θo[2− (1− δ)θo]
(1 + ψ)[1− (1− δ)θo] (A.26)
Now comparing Equation (A.26) with Equation (A.21), the RHSs of both equations are the same
and increase with θo. Note that (2− f)v ≥ v (LHSs of the two equations), so the equilibrium θo under
a quota will be larger than that in the status quo. In other words, implementing a quota to the status
quo will increase the participation rate. This holds as long as the participation rate in the status quo is
not 1 and there is room for improvement (i.e., v < (1− )(1 + 1δ )ψ−e(1+ψ)−ω1+ψ ). The impact of a quota on
the total amount of information posted in the community can still be seen by the dilemma highlighted in
Proposition xx. As in the main model, a quota will decrease the total amount of information and hence
the total privacy damage relative to the status quo.
The social welfare under a quota is given by
Πq =
∫ θo
0
[
(2f − f2)γi(θi)(1 + ψ)v
2
2c
−Qq(θo)λi(θi)
]
dθi +
∫ 1
θo
[−Qq(θo)λi(θi)]dθi
= f · (1 + ψ)v
c
· θo[1− 1− δ
2
θo]
{[
(1− f
2
)v − ψ(θ
o)2
2(1 + ψ)
+ (e+
ω
1 + ψ
)θo
]
−
(1− θo)
[
ψ(1 + θo)
2(1 + ψ)
− (e+ ω
1 + ψ
)
]} (A.27)
Due to the complexity of the model, it is challenging to derive the closed-form optimal quota by
comparing Πq with Πsq. We thus resort to numerical analysis to examine the impact of a quota. We set
f = 0.7 and use the same set of parameter values as in Figure A.1. Figure A.2 shows that there exists
a quota that increase the social welfare relative to the status quo, which is consistent with Proposition
5 and Figure 4 in the main text. Note that, we also vary the values of the key parameters - ψ and δ
from 0.1 to 0.9, and solve the numerical example under the different values. Under all these cases, we
discover consistent result that, with an appropriate quota, the social welfare can be increased relative to
the status quo.
(ii) Nonlinear externality. Following the same approach in the main model, we can derive the
equilibrium outcomes in the status quo as follows.
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Figure A.2: Social welfare as a function of participation rate in status quo and quota
(1) When 0 < v < 2(1 − )(1 − α)2λL: no non-committed users will participate. ssq = 1 − α.
Qsq = (1−α)γ(1+ψ)vc . Π
sq = (1−α)γ(1+ψ)v2c [v − 2(1− α)(1− α+ α)λ¯]. ξsq = (1−α)
2γψθ¯v
c .
(2) When 2(1−)(1−α)2λL ≤ v ≤ 2(1−)(1−αβ)2λL: only a fraction of non-committed low type
users will participate. ssq =
√
v
2(1−)λL . Q
sq = γ(1+ψ)vc
√
v
2(1−)λL . Π
sq = γ(1+ψ)v
2
2c
{
(1− α)− (1−α+α)λ¯(1−)λL
}
.
ξsq = γψθ¯v
2
2c(1−)λL
(3) When 2(1−)(1−αβ)2λL < v < 2(1−)(1−αβ)2λH : only all non-committed low type users will
participate. ssq = 1−αβ. Qsq = (1−αβ)γ(1+ψ)vc . Πsq = (1−αβ)γ(1+ψ)v2c
{
v − 2(1− αβ)[λ¯− (1− )αβλH ]
}
.
ξsq = (1−αβ)
2γψθ¯v
c .
(4) When 2(1 − )(1 − αβ)2λH ≤ v ≤ 2(1 − )λH : all non-committed low type users and a
fraction of non-committed high type users will participate. ssq =
√
v
2(1−)λH . Q
sq = γ(1+ψ)vc
√
v
2(1−)λH .
Πsq = γ(1+ψ)v
2
2c
[
1− λ¯(1−)λH
]
. ξsq =
γψθ¯v2
2c(1−)λH .
(5) When v > 2(1 − )λH : all non-committed users will participate. ssq = 1. Qsq = γ(1+ψ)vc .
Πsq = γ(1+ψ)v2c (v − 2λ¯). ξsq = γψθ¯vc .
Comparing the cutoff value of v when non-committed low type users start to participate here with
that in the main model, 2(1−α)2(1−)λL < 2(1−α)(1−)λL . Comparing the cutoff value of v when non-
committed high type users start to participate here with that in the main model, 2(1−αβ)2(1− )λH <
2(1− αβ)(1− )λH . So we obtain Lemma 5.
As we can see, the corresponding impact is that the cutoff values of v which characterize different
equilibrium outcomes change quantitatively. But all the results obtained in the main model can be
verified to hold qualitatively.
(iii) Unintentional Disclosure of Sensitive Information. Users may not know the information
they post is sensitive. We can modify the setup in line with this consideration. Assume users only make
decisions about the total amount of information to be posted about friends and non-friends, denoted as
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xij and xik respectively. There is a fraction, φ ∈ (0, 1), of the information posted by a user will cause
privacy harm on others. Users may not know which information belongs to this φ fraction. All other
settings and notations remain the same as in the main model. Then user i’s utility from participating in
the community conditional on participation size, s, is
uini|s = n(vxij −
cxij
2
) + (1− n)(vxik − cx
2
ik
2δ
) + eQ−i + ωX·i − θiY·i. (A.28)
(A.28) is the counterpart of equation (2) in the main model. Solving the FOCs yields xsqij =
v
c
and xsqik =
δv
c . Using these equilibrium quantities, we can derive user i’s net utility from participating in
the community is
uin−outi|s =
γv
2c
[v − 2(1− )sλi],
where λi = φθi − e− (1− φ)ω has the same interpretation as in the main model. Then all the results in
the main model can be easily replicated here. As we can see, the only difference is that ψ1+ψ in the main
model is replaced by φ here. That is because we conveniently capture the differences in the quantities of
non-sensitive and sensitive information posted by a user through the cost ratio parameter, ψ, which is
also exogenously given. As a result, an exogenous and fixed fraction of the total amount of information
posted by a user is privacy-infringing. Therefore, ψ1+ψ is equivalent to φ.
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